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THE NEOLIBERAL TURN IN REGIONAL TRADE 
AGREEMENTS 
James Thuo Gathii* 
Abstract: This Article makes two primary arguments. First, that the increased resort to 
bilateral and regional trade agreements has taken a neoliberal turn. As such bilateral and 
regional trade agreements are now a primary means through which greater investor 
protections, commodification of social services, guaranteed rights of investor access to 
investment opportunities, privatization of public service goods, and generally the diminution 
of sovereign control are being realized. These trade agreements make the foregoing goals 
possible not just in developing countries, but in industrialized economies as well. I show that 
these agreements provide business interests with opportunities to exercise concerted pressure 
to influence the adoption of neoliberal economic policies in both 
developed economies and developing economies.  
 
Second, this Article argues that bilateralism and regionalism in trade are contemporary fads 
that are spreading neoliberal economic ideals in the periphery of the global trading system. In 
other words, emulation by small developing countries of neoliberal economic policies in 
developed countries is a significant driver of economic reform. Developing countries adopt 
neoliberalism not simply because it is imposed, as many accounts suggest. Rather, 
neoliberalism is also voluntarily adopted for a variety of reasons: (i) because there has been a 
convergence in the thinking of policymakers and academic thinkers in developing and 
developed countries in part as a result of socialization through education or professional 
associations and contacts; (ii) as a result of persuasion that neoliberal reforms are important 
preconditions for goals such as increased economic growth or the efficiency of public sector 
institutions, developing country officials have adopted them; (iii) public officials in 
developing countries are strategically adopting neoliberal reforms since they are regarded as 
a signaling device that their country is ‘safe’ for investment or because bilateral and regional 
trade agreements come with budget support that is otherwise unavailable to these developing 
country officials in their home country; (iv) officials in developing countries are passive 
imitators who in the absence of solid evidence as to the efficacy of neoliberal ideals on their 
own account or in relation to alternative reform ideas are rationally bounded actors who find 
it impractical to assess the efficacy of neoliberal ideals or their alternatives.  
 
In short, this Article argues that the increased number of regional and bilateral trade 
agreements represents an important opportunity for the further diffusion of neoliberal 
economic ideals, an insight often missing in leading accounts that have emphasized how this 
trend conforms or departs from the norms of the World Trade Organization. This paper does 
so using a constructivist account of the circumstances under which neoliberalism arises in the 
turn towards regionalism and bilateralism. It shows how ideas about market governance and 
the institutions and experts that generate and perpetuate these ideas impose an incentive 
structure within which choices in favor of neoliberalism are more than less likely to be 
exercised. 
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INTRODUCTION 
This Article argues that the increased resort to bilateral and regional 
trade agreements has taken a neoliberal turn. These trade agreements are 
now a primary means being used to realize neoliberal economic policies 
around the world. These neoliberal policies include trade liberalization, 
greater investor protections, commodification of social services, 
guaranteed rights of investor access to investment opportunities, 
privatization of public service goods, and generally the diminution of 
sovereign control over national economies. These trade agreements 
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make the spread of neoliberal policies possible not just in developing 
countries, but in industrialized economies as well. I show that these 
agreements provide business interests with opportunities to exercise 
concerted pressure to influence the adoption of neoliberal economic 
policies in both developed economies and developing economies. 
As such, this Article tells a story of spreading neoliberalism, not only 
through the market power of developed economies, or coercion, as this 
story has been predominantly told, but also through constructivist 
influences.1 Constructivism explains the spread of neoliberalism in 
regional trade agreements in a number of ways, including the increasing 
convergence of business interests with a largely shared set of ideas 
supporting market governance in developing and developed countries 
that form coalitions to support mutually beneficial agreements.2 Further, 
top government officials in developing countries have increasingly 
begun mimicking developed countries’ strategies, including the pursuit 
of regional and bilateral trade agreements. 
This Article therefore differs from leading accounts of the spread of 
neoliberalism that primarily or exclusively focus on the role of coercion 
to account for the diffusion of neoliberalism.3 It also differs from 
accounts put forth by realists and critics of neoliberalism.4 Further, my 
approach in this Article differs from the liberal intergovernmentalist 
                                                     
* Associate Dean for Research and Scholarship and Governor George E. Pataki Professor of 
International Commercial Law, Albany Law School. Many thanks to Claire Kelly and Nicola 
Fernanda for their very insightful comments. Thanks also to the participants of the International 
Law Colloquium at Temple Law School, the Global Law and its Exceptions Conference at the 
University of Washington School of Law, Seattle, as well as the 4th Trade Policy Research Forum at 
the Trade Policy Training Institute in Africa (TRAPCA), in Arusha, Tanzania, for their comments. 
George Hanok, Kevin Ramakrishna and Rebecca Fantauzzi provided research assistance. 
1. For constructivists’ accounts in international law, see generally David J. Bederman, 
Constructivism, Positivism, and Empiricism in International Law, 89 GEO. L.J. 469 (2001) 
(reviewing ANTHONY CLARK AREND, LEGAL RULES AND INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY (1999)); Jutta 
Brunnée and Stephen J. Toope, International Law and Constructivism: Elements of an Interactional 
Theory of International Law, 39 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 19 (2000); Claire R. Kelly, Realist 
Theory and Real Constraints, 44 VA. J. INT’L L. 545 (2004); Claire R. Kelly, The Value Vacuum: 
Self-Enforcing Regimes and the Dilution of the Normative Feedback Loop, 22 MICH. J. INT’L L. 673 
(2000–2001). 
2. Other plausible accounts of neoliberalism in developing countries include “sincere deference to 
authority, a culturally appropriate action, or the response to education by the new elite.” Andrew 
Moravcsik, Bringing Constructivist Integration Theory Out of the Clouds: Has It Landed Yet?, 2 
EUR. POL. 219, 237 (2001). 
3. Robert O. Keohane & Lisa L. Martin, The Promise of Institutionalist Theory, 20 INT’L SEC. 39 
(1995). 
4. Realists argue that international institutions and rules mitigate the anarchical nature of 
international society. See generally Joseph M. Grieco, Anarchy and the Limits of Cooperation: A 
Realist Critique of the Newest Liberal Institutionalism, 42 INT’L ORG. 485 (1988). 
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approach that focuses on how economic interests, relative power, and the 
need for credible commitments alter actors’ instrumental calculations.5 
The claim here is not that constructivism is a superior explanatory or 
causal factor in the diffusion of neoliberalism to the preceding largely 
functionalist and rationalist approaches. Rather, the argument is that 
constructivism can help account for the circumstances under which 
neoliberalism arises in the turn towards regionalism and bilateralism in 
trade. It does so by taking into account how ideas about market 
governance generated by institutions and experts define the parameters 
within which choices in favor of neoliberalism are likely to be exercised. 
A constructivist approach therefore supplements functionalist and 
rationalist approaches by foregrounding the importance of ideas in the 
diffusion of phenomena such as neoliberalism. A constructivist approach 
does not focus on donor conditionality or coercion, but instead 
highlights that neoliberalism in bilateral and regional trade agreements 
may very well be the result of a tactical or strategic policy adjustment. 
Proliferation of regionalism and bilateralism may also be a response 
to technological or market trends as a consequence of changes in ideas 
that were mimicked or voluntarily adopted, because the mimickers came 
to believe them and began changing their economic goals and policies 
accordingly.6 Simply put, constructivism helps to explain how 
socialization into new norms and ideas influences both governmental 
policies and behavior.7 The increasing use of regional trade agreements 
serves as a good case study of such constructivism. Finally, this Article 
differs from other accounts of the proliferation of bilateral and regional 
trade agreements by seeking to examine whether these agreements are 
building or stumbling blocks to multilateral trade.8 
This Article shows that free trade agreements (FTAs) and bilateral 
investment agreements include treaty commitments in areas such as 
                                                     
5. See ANDREW MORAVCSIK, THE CHOICE FOR EUROPE: SOCIAL PURPOSE AND STATE POWER 
FROM MESSINA TO MAASTRICHT (1998). 
6. In other words, the claim is not that constructivism itself is a binding constraint on policy. This 
is not to overstate the possibility that political behavior is not always consistent with stated 
principled justifications. See ROBERT PUTNAM, THE BELIEFS OF POLITICIANS: IDEOLOGY, 
CONFLICT, AND DEMOCRACY IN BRITAIN AND ITALY (1973). 
7. Notably, even critics of constructivism agree that European Union (EU) integration has been 
linked to neoliberal ideology. See Moravcsik, supra note 2, at 230. Notably, Moravcsik approvingly 
quotes Checkel: “Can one really disentangle preference change driven by persuasion and 
socialization from strategic adaptation in the face of changed incentives, or from passive, 
cognitively simplifying imitation?” Id. at 232. 
8. See generally James Thuo Gathii, African Regional Trade Agreements as Flexible Legal 
Regimes, 35 N.C. J. INT’L L. & COM. REG. 571 (2010) (discussing the arguments over whether 
regional trade agreements are building or stumbling blocks but not drawing any conclusions).  
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government procurement and investor protection that provide a foothold 
for U.S. investors in signatory countries that are otherwise unavailable in 
the World Trade Organization (WTO). In addition, these FTAs 
incorporate heightened intellectual property rights protection and 
financial liberalization commitments which go beyond the treaty 
commitments contained in the WTO’s Agreement on Trade-Related 
Aspects of Intellectual Policy (TRIPS). 
Regional and bilateral trade agreements adopt many of the elements 
of the Washington Consensus of economic reform for development9 that 
have had several consequences. First, developing country signatory 
states assume enhanced obligations to protect the rights of foreign 
investors—a role that often creates enormous tensions with their role as 
guardians of their citizens.10 By adopting many elements of the 
Washington Consensus, these agreements open markets in developing 
countries to transnational corporations that, in essence, become 
providers of social services, including education, health, water, 
electricity, garbage collection, and disposal. As a result, these 
agreements help to commoditize and make social services tradable 
opportunities for which foreign investors can compete.11 Signatory 
countries to bilateral and regional trade agreements as well as bilateral 
investment treaties gain access to a market of tradable services. These 
treaties guarantee investors the non-discrimination rights of most 
favored nations as well as national treatment, transparency, and the right 
to arbitration over any dispute covered by the agreements.12 Further, 
                                                     
9. Washington Consensus refers to the summation of reforms summarized by John Williamson in 
1989 that came to be widely accepted at the time and were being undertaken in Latin America 
before being adopted elsewhere. See John Williamson, Peterson Inst. for Int’l Econ., Outline of 
Speech at the Center for Strategic & International Studies: Did the Washington Consensus Fail? 
(Nov. 6, 2002), http://www.iie.com/publications/papers/paper.cfm?researchid=488. The three 
overarching ideas were: macro-economic discipline, a market economy, and openness to the world 
in respect to trade and foreign direct investment. Id. Williamson also presented a list of ten specific 
policy prescriptions: fiscal discipline, particularly by reducing large deficits and balance of 
payments as high inflation; reordering public expenditure policies; tax reform; liberalizing interest 
rates; a competitive exchange rate; trade liberalization; liberalization of inward foreign direct 
investment; privatization; deregulation; and strong property rights regimes. Id.  
10. See generally Joel Ngugi, Making New Wine for Old Wineskins: Can the Reform of 
International Law Emancipate the Third World in the Age of Globalization?, 8 U.C. DAVIS J. INT’L 
L. & POL’Y 73 (2002). 
11. See Poverty Reduction and Econ. Mgmt. Afr. Region, Africa’s Trade in Services and 
Economic Partnership Agreements Report No. 55747-AFR, WORLD BANK (July 20, 2010), 
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTAFRREGTOPTRADE/Resources/AfricaTradeinServicesand
EPAsNEW.pdf. 
12. See JAMES THUO GATHII, WAR, COMMERCE, AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 191–200 (2009) 
(discussing conflict over tradable resources resulting in privatized war because of market access for 
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because services are provided through the market rather than through the 
state, the public becomes less able to hold governments accountable 
when they do not provide quality, affordable, and accessible services. As 
a consequence, these agreements reach “deep behind the border[s of 
developing countries], guaranteeing rights of entry and commercial 
operation to foreign services firms and imposing market disciplines on 
the policy and regulatory choices of national governments.”13 
The turn to regional FTAs also makes it much easier to bully smaller 
groups of countries to commit to the objectives of the Washington 
Consensus or neoliberal economic restructuring than it would be through 
arduous multilateral trade negotiations at the WTO. Notably, however, 
the aggressive unilateralism of bilateral and regional trade agreements 
has not always assured victory for big countries.14 This Article shows in 
Part III that the United States has been unable to conclude a full-fledged 
free trade agreement with the Southern African Customs Union (SACU), 
which objected to many of the commitments the United States proposed. 
In addition, as already noted above, many developing countries 
committed themselves to pursuing bilateral and regional trade 
agreements to promote their interests in very much the same way that 
developed economies have. In so doing, they have mimicked the turn to 
bilateralism and regionalism pursued by the major trading partners by 
changing their policies and preferences in trade among themselves as 
well as with major trading partners. 
Part I outlines the standard justifications in favor of bilateralism and 
regionalism in trade and the long litany of such agreements entered into 
by the United States and the European Union (EU). This Part will also 
discuss the Model Agreements used by the United States and the EU and 
the type of commitments contained in them. 
Part II examines the primarily rationalist reasons for the unmistakable 
spike in bilateralism and regionalism in the recent past, including forum 
shifting,15 and describes how the turn to regionalism has affected 
                                                     
the goods). 
13. Jane Kelsey, Confronting Trade-Related Human Rights in a GATS-Compatible World, L. 
SOC. JUST. & GLOBAL DEV., 1, 3 Dec. 6, 2007), available at 
http://www.go.warwick.ac.uk/elj/lgd/2007_1/kelsey. 
14. In fact, statistical evidence suggests as much. See Ka Zeng, Trade Structure and the 
Effectiveness of America’s “Aggressively Unilateral” Trade Policy, 46 INT’L STUD. Q. 93 (2002) 
(explaining possible reasons for the United States’ “uneven success” in gaining concessions from 
bargaining partner). 
15. See Peter Drahos, Four Lessons for Developing Countries From the Trade Negotiations Over 
Access to Medicines, 28 LIVERPOOL L. REV. 11, 33 (2007) (“Essentially it allows [a country] to 
increase its opportunities to play for a win by not confining the pursuit of its negotiating agenda to 
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developing countries’ abilities to build coalitions around trade 
negotiations. This Part also examines another important reason for the 
spread of bilateralism and regionalism—constructivism. It discusses 
diffusion, mimicry, and competition for resources and markets as other 
reasons for the spread of bilateralism. 
Finally, Part III examines how the types of commitments being 
included in bilateral and regional trade agreements fortify the agenda of 
the Washington Consensus with specific examples from the Economic 
Partnership Agreement (EPA) between the Caribbean Forum 
(CARIFORUM) and the European Community (EC),16 as well as the 
U.S.–Morocco FTA of 2003. This Part also contrasts the failure of the 
U.S.–SACU FTA with the recently concluded and ratified U.S.–South 
Korea FTA. 
I.  THE TREND TOWARD TRADE REGIONALISM AND 
BILATERALISM 
This section traces the trend towards regional and bilateral trade 
agreements. It shows this trend demonstrates a marked change—with 
more emphasis placed on regional and bilateral trade agreements than on 
multilateral trade negotiations through the WTO. As the graphic 
illustration from the WTO shows, this trend started accelerating in the 
early 1990s. In the early part of the twenty-first century as WTO 
negotiations faltered, this upward trend in bilateral and regional trade 
agreements continued. 
A. The Long Litany of U.S. Regional and Bilateral Trade and 
Investment Agreements 
One of the first bipartisan standing ovations that President Obama 
received in his 2010 State of the Union address was for his declaration 
that the United States was committed to pursuing trade agreements with 
other countries.17 Such agreements, he noted, would create jobs for 
                                                     
one international forum.”). 
16. The sixteen members are Antigua and Barbuda, the Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Cuba, 
Dominica, Dominican Republic, Grenada, Guyana, Haiti, Jamaica, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint 
Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Suriname, and Trinidad and Tobago. List of Caribbean 
Community (CARICOM) Member States, OFF. OF TRADE NEGOTIATIONS, 
http://www.crnm.org/index.php?option=com_simplelists&view=simplelist&layout=basic&category
_id=81&Itemid=141 (last visited Aug. 11, 2011). 
17. See Barack Obama, President of the U.S., State of the Union Address (Jan. 27, 2010), 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/remarks-president-state-union-address [hereinafter 
2010 State of the Union Address]. 
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Americans and opportunities for U.S. exporters.18 Similarly, in the 2011 
State of the Union address, President Obama urged Congress to pass 
trade deals his administration had signed with India, China, and South 
Korea.19 He said, to further bipartisan applause, that he was determined 
to continue pursuing trade agreements with Panama, Colombia, and with 
the Asia-Pacific region.20 President Obama, like many former presidents, 
has made it a goal to export more American goods—which the President 
wants to double in the next five years—as a central pillar of his job 
creation strategy.21 In fact, trade agreements are part of President 
Obama’s plan to create two million jobs under a National Export 
Initiative to “help farmers and small businesses increase their exports 
and reform export controls consistent with national security.”22 
Related to this, the President also announced that the United States 
must “seek new markets aggressively,” just as its competitors are 
doing.23 As he put it, “[i]f America sits on the sidelines while other 
nations sign trade deals, we will lose the chance to create jobs on our 
shores.”24 President Obama further argued in favor of “enforcing those 
[trade] agreements so our trading partners play by the rules.”25 He 
argued that the administration was continuing to “shape a Doha trade 
agreement that opens global markets,” as well as to “strengthen our trade 
relations in Asia and with key partners like South Korea and Panama and 
                                                     
18. See id. President Obama outlined this strategy in an address to his Export Council. See 
Remarks Prior to a Meeting with the President’s Export Council, 2010 DAILY COMP. PRES. DOC. 
(Dec. 9, 2010), available at http://origin.www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/DCPD-201001055/pdf/DCPD-
201001055.pdf (where the President referred back to his 2010 State of the Union address promising 
to open foreign markets for U.S. products and to create jobs for U.S. workers). The Export Council 
had outlined a strategy for improving U.S. exports that included entering into more trade 
agreements that would open foreign markets. See EXPORT PROMOTION CABINET, REPORT TO THE 
PRESIDENT ON THE NATIONAL EXPORT INITIATIVE: THE EXPORT PROMOTION CABINET’S PLAN FOR 
DOUBLING U.S. EXPORTS IN FIVE YEARS (Sept. 10, 2010), available at 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/nei_report_9-16-10_full.pdf. 
19. See Barack Obama, President of the U.S., State of the Union Address (Jan. 25, 2011), 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2011/01/25/remarks-president-state-union-address. 
20. Id. 
21. See 2010 State of the Union Address, supra note 18. 
22. Id. 
23. Id. 
24. Id; see also Richard E. Baldwin, A Domino Theory of Regionalism, in EXPANDING 
MEMBERSHIP IN THE EUROPEAN UNION 25 (Richard E. Baldwin et al. eds, 1995) (advancing the 
competitive liberalization hypothesis to account for the increased spread of regional and bilateral 
trade agreements and advancing a domino theory to account for the increased spread of regionalism 
and bilateralism). 
25. 2010 State of the Union Address, supra note 18. 
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Colombia. (Applause.)”26 
None of these proposals was new. The Obama administration’s trade 
policy in many respects continues the trade policy of previous 
administrations. Notably, on December 14, 2009, the United States 
Trade Representative (USTR) notified Congress of the Obama 
administration’s intention to negotiate a Trans-Pacific Partnership 
Agreement (TPP).27 This agreement, the USTR argued, represents a 
“new kind of trade agreement for the 21st century.”28 As this 
announcement shows, the Obama administration is carrying forward the 
recent U.S. policy of market opening and job creation through regional 
and bilateral free trade agreements. Initiatives such as the TPP are not 
surprising—for at least a decade, pursuing such objectives at the 
WTOhas not been very successful.29 The deadlock in multilateral trade 
negotiations has made bilateral and regional agreements more viable 
alternatives.30 
The United States and the EU increasingly use regionalism and 
bilateralism as important avenues for consolidating and implementing 
their respective trade agendas.31 However, the trend towards regionalism 
and bilateralism in trade has expanded beyond these big economies.32 
Developing economies are also feverishly negotiating these agreements. 
For example, the SACU, which comprises South Africa, Botswana, and 
                                                     
26. Id.  
27. See TPP Statements and Actions to Date, OFF. U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, 
http://www.ustr.gov/about-us/press-office/fact-sheets/2009/december/tpp-statements-and-actions-
date (last visited Aug. 31, 2011); see also Economic Opportunities and the TPP, OFF. U.S. TRADE 
REPRESENTATIVE, http://www.ustr.gov/about-us/press-office/fact-sheets/2009/december/economic-
opportunities-and-tpp (last visited Aug. 28, 2011).  
28. Press Release, Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, Trans-Pacific Partnership 
Announcement (Dec. 14, 2009),  http://www.ustr.gov/about-us/press-office/press-
releases/2009/december/trans-pacific-partnership-announcement. 
29. See C. O’Neal Taylor, The U.S. Approach to Regionalism: Recent Past and Future, 15 ILSA 
J. INT’L & COMP. L. 411, 417 (2009). 
30. For more discussion on the shift to bilateral and regional trade agreements, see infra Part II. 
31. See Taylor, supra note 29, at 418. 
32. There is substantial literature on whether regional blocs are a stumbling block for global trade 
integration. See Jagdish Bhagwati, THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM AT RISK (1991); see also Jagdish 
Bhagwati, U.S. Trade Policy: The Infatuation With Free Trade Areas, in THE DANGEROUS DRIFT 
TO PREFERENTIAL TRADE AGREEMENTS 1 (Jagdish Bhagwati & Anne O. Krueger eds., 1995); 
Jagdish Bhagwati, David Greenaway & Arvind Panagariya, Trading Preferentially: Theory and 
Policy, 108 ECON. J. 1128, 1138 (1998); Arvind Panagariya, Preferential Trade Liberalization: The 
Traditional Theory and New Developments, 38 J. ECON. LITERATURE 287, 328 (2000); Consultative 
Board to the Director-General, The Future of the WTO: Addressing Institutional Challenges in the 
New Millennium (2004), available at 
http://www.wto.org/English/thewto_e/10anniv_e/future_wto_e.pdf. 
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three of the poorest economies in southern Africa—Lesotho, Namibia, 
and Swaziland—signed a European Free Trade Agreement (EFTA) with 
Norway, Iceland, and Switzerland/Liechtenstein in 2006;33 the Mercado 
Común del Sur (MERCOSUR), a Preferential Trade Agreement, with 
Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, and Uruguay in 2004;34 a Trade, 
Investment, and Development Cooperation Agreement (TIDCA) with 
the United States in 2008;35 and is currently negotiating a FTA with 
India.36 The WTO Committee on Regional Trade Agreements reports 
that as of October 15, 2009, “457 regional trade agreements (RTAs), 
counting goods and services notifications separately, have been notified 
to the GATT/WTO, 266 of which are currently in force.”37 
This section outlines and discusses the proliferation of bilateral and 
regional trade and investment agreements such as the ones discussed 
above. The number of these agreements entered into in the last few years 
demonstrates a preference for regional and bilateral trade agreements 
over multilateral trade agreements. This section also shows the broad 
range of areas that are covered by these agreements. 
1. Bilateral Trade Agreements 
Currently, the United States has FTAs in effect with seventeen 
nations.38 Of these, eleven FTAs are bilateral agreements.39 The United 
States also has free trade agreements with regional blocs, including the 
North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and the U.S.–Central 
America–Dominican Republic Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA-DR).40 
The first bilateral FTA, between the United States and Israel, went 
into effect in 1985.41 This was followed, over fifteen years later, by the 
U.S.–Jordan bilateral agreement, which became effective in 2001.42 The 
                                                     
33. Bi-lateral Trade Negotiations, S. AFR. CUSTOMS UNION, 
http://www.sacu.int/traden.php?id=414 (last visited Aug. 11, 2011). 
34. Id. 
35. Id. 
36. Id. 
37. Committee on Regional Trade Agreements, Report (2009) of the Committee on Regional 
Trade Agreements to the General Council, WT/REG/20 (Oct. 16, 2009). 
38. List of U.S. Free Trade Agreements, OFF. U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, 
http://www.ustr.gov/trade-agreements/free-trade-agreements (last visited Aug. 12, 2011). 
39. Id. (Australia, Bahrain, Chile, Columbia, Israel, Jordan, Morocco, Oman, Panama, Peru, and 
Singapore).  
40. See id.  
41. Overview of the Israel Free Trade Agreement, OFF. U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, 
http://www.ustr.gov/trade-agreements/free-trade-agreements/israel-fta (last visited July 17, 2011). 
42. Overview of the Jordan Free Trade Agreement, OFF. U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, 
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United States entered into more FTAs with countries such as Singapore 
and Chile in 2004, Australia in 2005, Morocco and Bahrain in 2006,43 
and Peru44 and Oman in 2009.45 
The United States has also signed free trade agreements with several 
countries—agreements that Congress has yet to ratify.46 These unratified 
agreements include an FTA with Colombia (2006), South Korea 
(initially concluded in 2007 but eventually ratified by Congress and 
signed by the President in October 2011), and Panama (2007).47 The 
United States concluded negotiations on the South Korean FTA in early 
December 2010. 48 It initiated, but later suspended, negotiations with 
Thailand.49 Continuing negotiations are underway with Malaysia, the 
United Arab Emirates, and the SACU.50 
                                                     
http://www.ustr.gov/trade-agreements/free-trade-agreements/jordan-fta (last visited July 17, 2011); 
The U.S.-Jordan Free Trade Agreement Fact Sheet, SUKHTIAN.COM, 
http://www.sukhtian.com/uploads/factsheet.pdf (last visited Sept. 19, 2011). 
43. Summary of U.S. Free Trade Agreements, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, 
http://www.state.gov/e/eeb/tpp/bta/fta/c26474.htm (last visited Sept. 21, 2011). 
44. Overview of Peru Free Trade Promotion Agreement, OFF. U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, 
http://www.ustr.gov/trade-agreements/free-trade-agreements/peru-tpa (last visited Sept. 21, 2011). 
45. Overview of Oman Free Trade Agreement, OFF. U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, 
http://www.ustr.gov/trade-agreements/free-trade-agreements/oman-fta (last visited Sept. 21, 2011).   
46. List of U.S. Free Trade Agreements, supra note 38 (“The United States has signed free trade 
agreements with Colombia, Korea, and Panama, but Congress must enact legislation to approve and 
implement each individual agreement in order for them to go into effect.”). President Obama sent 
these agreements to Congress for votes in early October 2011 and votes are expected on them 
before the end of the month in the Senate.  See Len Braken, Reid, Daley Eye Oct. 12 Trade Deal 
Votes; House Rules, Senate Finance Acts Pave Way, INT’L TRADE REPORTER ONLINE (BNA) 
(Oct. 6, 2011), available at 
http://news.bna.com/itln/lpages/lpages.adp?pg=breaking_news&bn_product=itln#urn:bna:a0c9g3q0
x8. Congress eventually voted on the Agreements in mid-October 2011 and on Friday October 21, 
2011, President Obama signed them into law. See Tom Devaney, Obama Signs Free-Trade Pacts, 
WASH. TIMES (Oct. 21, 2011), http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2011/oct/21/obama-signs-
free-trade-pacts.  
47. See supra note 46. 
48. Julie Pace & Ken Thomas, Obama Hails S. Korea Trade Deal as Victory for US Workers, 
ABC NEWS (Dec. 4, 2010), http://abcnews.go.com/Business/wireStory?id=12313653. 
49. Overview of U.S. Trade with Thailand, OFF. U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, 
http://www.ustr.gov/countries-regions/southeast-asia-pacific/thailand (last visited Sept. 19, 2011). 
50. Trade Agreement Advisory Services, THE ALL AM. SMALL BUS. EXP. ASS’N, 
http://aasbea.com/portal/index.php/international (last visited Sept. 19, 2011). The President’s Export 
Council has made it an objective to “[u]se bilateral trade policy mechanisms to expand market-
opening opportunities. Bilateral trade policy mechanisms, such as FTAs, Trade and Investment 
Framework Agreements, Joint Committees on Trade and Investment, and Bilateral Consultative 
Mechanisms, can be used to create new market opportunities with other key trading partners.” 
EXPORT PROMOTION CABINET, supra note 18. 
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2. Regional Initiatives 
In addition to pursuing bilateral trade agreements, the United States 
has entered into regional trade agreements including: the Association of 
Southeast Asian Nations, (ASEAN), Trade and Investment Framework 
Agreement, which was concluded in 2006; the U.S. Trans-Pacific 
Partnership (TPP) FTA, which is currently under re-negotiation; the 
CAFTA-DR FTA, which has been in effect since 2004 between the 
United States and El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, 
Dominican Republic, and Costa Rica;51 and NAFTA, which has been in 
effect since 1994 between Canada, Mexico, and the United States.52 
3. Trade and Investment Framework Agreements (TIFAs) 
The United States also has forty-four trade and investment framework 
agreements: eleven in Africa; fifteen in Europe and the Middle East; five 
in South and Central Asia; nine in Southeast Asia; and four in the 
Americas.53 According to the United States Trade Representative, TIFAs 
“provide strategic frameworks and principles for dialogue on trade and 
investment issues between the United States and the other parties to the 
TIFA.”54 They also establish a framework for consultations and 
cooperation with a view to enhancing opportunities for trade and 
investment.55 
4. Bilateral Investment Treaties (BITs) 
The United States also signs BITs to guarantee U.S. investors 
favorable terms and conditions for private investment under international 
law. BITs guarantee fair and equitable treatment for investors, protect 
against discriminatory treatment and expropriation, and ensure investor 
dispute settlement through international arbitration.56 Currently, the 
                                                     
51. Overview of the Dominican Republic–Central America FTA (CAFTA), OFF. U.S. TRADE 
REPRESENTATIVE, http://www.ustr.gov/trade-agreements/free-trade-agreements/cafta-dr-dominican-
republic-central-america-fta (last visited Sept. 21, 2011). 
52. Overview of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), OFF. U.S. TRADE 
REPRESENTATIVE, http://www.ustr.gov/trade-agreements/free-trade-agreements/north-american-
free-trade-agreement-nafta (last visited Sept. 21, 2011). 
53. See Trade & Investment Framework Agreements, OFF. U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, 
http://www.ustr.gov/trade-agreements/trade-investment-framework-agreements (last visited July 17, 
2011). 
54. Id.  
55. Id. 
56. Overview of the U.S. Bilateral Investment Treaty Program, OFF. U.S. TRADE 
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United States has BITs with forty nations.57 
5. Model Agreements 
The United States has varying model FTAs and a Model BIT.58 
Unlike NAFTA, the U.S. FTA models have extensive obligations while 
also extending trade rules to many new areas not covered in any WTO 
treaty.59 The obligations included in a typical U.S. Model FTA cover a 
broad range of areas including national treatment and market access for 
goods, general rules of origin, sector specific rules of origin, customs 
procedures, agriculture, standards, trade measures, government 
procurement, investment, services, competition policy, temporary entry, 
and intellectual property rights.60 
While NAFTA was primarily intended to liberalize trade in goods, 
today’s U.S. FTAs go beyond that. For example, they impose extensive 
obligations in areas such as trade in services, as well as obligations in 
areas that developing countries have blocked at the WTO, such as 
government procurement and competition policy.61 For this reason, these 
trade treaties are designed to advance economic reforms such as 
liberalization, deregulation and privatization that favor U.S. business 
interests and consumers in the countries that sign them. As some 
commentators have noted, BITs in particular are more like “Bills of 
Rights” for foreign investors that guarantee rights of access and due 
process rights in signatory countries that are backed by binding 
international arbitration.62 BIT and FTA negotiations increasingly cover 
                                                     
REPRESENTATIVE, http://www.ustr.gov/trade-agreements/bilateral-investment-treaties (last visited 
Sept. 19, 2011). 
57. See Index of U.S. Bilateral Investment Treaties, TRADE COMPLIANCE CTR., 
http://tcc.export.gov/Trade_Agreements/Bilateral_Investment_Treaties/index.asp (last visited July 
17, 2011). 
58. See Model U.S. Bilateral Investment Treaty, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE (2004), 
http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/117601.pdf; Testimony Regarding the Proposed 
United States – Trans-Pacific Partnership Free Trade Agreement, PUB. CITIZEN (Mar. 4, 2009), 
http://www.citizen.org/documents/TPPFTACommentsFinal1.pdf; see also generally C. O’Neal 
Taylor, Of Free Trade Agreements and Models, 19 IND. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 569 (2009) 
(discussing the U.S. model free trade agreement). On the use of NAFTA as a model for subsequent 
FTAs and their variation, see David Gantz, The Evolution of FTA Investment Provisions: From 
NAFTA to the United States - Chile Free Trade Agreement, 19 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 679 (2004). 
59. See Taylor, supra note 58. 
60. Id. at 585–86. 
61. See Martin Khor, Developing Countries Resist WTO Agreement on ‘Competition Policy,’ 
THIRD WORLD NETWORK (Apr. 1999), http://www.twnside.org.sg/title/1889-cn.htm. 
62. Jose E. Alvarez, North American Free Trade Agreement’s Chapter Eleven, 28 U. MIAMI 
INTER-AM. L. REV. 303, 308 (1997); see also id. at 304 (arguing that NAFTA is a “bilateral 
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the same subject matter. For example, a typical U.S. FTA includes 
provisions for investment protection.63 The convergence of BITS and 
FTAs is helping the EU and United States to defragment the distinctions 
between trade and investment and create stronger rights and protections 
for investors. 
B. Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs) and the EU’s Global 
Europe Strategy 
The EU has also taken significant steps to protect its economic 
interests with other nations through regional and bilateral trade 
agreements. The current negotiations on EPAs with African, Caribbean, 
and Pacific (ACP) States exemplify this quite well.64 The EU’s agenda is 
embodied in the October 2006 Global Europe Strategy. The primary 
goal of this strategy is to make Europe more competitive by giving “a 
sharper focus on market opening and stronger rules in new trade areas of 
economic importance to the [EU], notably intellectual property, services, 
investment, public procurement and competition.”65 In this strategy, the 
EU declared the need for comprehensive trade agreements that would 
uphold the need to protect the competitiveness of EU’s markets while 
safeguarding EU export interests through tariffs and non-tariff barriers.66 
These objectives are more recently reflected in the EU’s 2020 
Strategy.67 This strategy argues that “the EU will require a stronger 
                                                     
investment treaty on steroids”). This theme is further echoed in PHILIPPE SANDS, LAWLESS WORLD: 
AMERICA AND THE MAKING AND BREAKING OF GLOBAL RULES FROM FDR’S ATLANTIC CHARTER 
TO GEORGE W. BUSH’S ILLEGAL WAR 117–42 (2005) (noting the tendency to interpret international 
investment rules in isolation of other international law rules and to give priority to investor rights 
over rules that protect human rights and the environment).  
63. See Taylor, supra note 58, at 592. 
64. EPA negotiations were triggered by article 36 of the Cotonou Agreement, a partnership 
agreement between the EU and African, Caribbean, and Pacific (ACP) states, following a decision 
of the WTO Dispute Settlement Body requiring these parties to negotiate WTO compliant trade 
agreements. See Agreement Amending for the Second Time the Partnership Agreement Between the 
Members of the African, Caribbean and Pacific Group of States, of the One Part, and the European 
Community and Its Member States, of the Other Part, Mar. 19, 2010, 2010 O.J. (L 287) 3, http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2010:287:0003:0049:EN:PDF [hereinafter 
Cotonou Agreement]. 
65. Trade Policy Review Body, Report by the European Communities, WT/TPR/G/177, at 10–11 
(Jan. 22, 2007), http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/tpr_e/g177_e.doc. 
66. See Global Europe: Competing in the World, EUROPEAN COMM’N, 2 (2006), 
http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2006/october/tradoc_130376.pdf [hereinafter Global Europe 
Strategy]. 
67. See European Commission, Trade Policy as a Core Component of the EU’s 2020 Strategy, 
COM (2010) 612 final (Nov. 9, 2010).  
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export orientation” to create more growth and jobs.68 This strategy 
makes the case for a strong and positive link between trade and growth. 
The European Commission gives several reasons for this linkage: 
First, [trade] openness enhances efficient resource allocation. It 
creates incentives for capital and labour to be put to work in 
areas with the highest return. Second, trade facilitates the 
dissemination of knowledge and innovations embodied in goods, 
services and investments. Third, open trade encourages 
competition and thereby provides an incentive to supply the best 
quality/price ratio of goods to consumers and to increase 
productivity. Fourth, opening up trade gives producers access to 
larger markets and hence, the possibility to reap the benefits of 
increasing returns to scale and specialisation.69 
In short, the EU attributes to trade opening three critical benefits: 
economic growth, consumer benefits, and employment.70 
The EU’s economic partnership agreements are similar to the typical 
U.S. Model FTA in a number of respects. While the United States has a 
greater interest in using trade agreements to advance its foreign policy 
and national security goals,71 the EU primarily uses regional and 
bilateral trade agreements to protect its economy and advance the 
competiveness of its industries in the global market.72 Accordingly, the 
EU arguably takes for granted that its “commercial interests correspond 
to the development needs” of the countries with which it signs bilateral 
                                                     
68. European Commission Staff, Trade as a Driver of Prosperity, at 4, SEC (2010) 1269. 
69. Id. at 8–9. 
70. This 2020 Strategy is a continuation of the EU’s trade agenda embodied in the October 2006 
Global Europe Strategy. The primary goal of the Global Europe Strategy was to make Europe more 
competitive by giving “a sharper focus on market opening and stronger rules in new trade areas of 
economic importance to the [EU], notably intellectual property (IPR), services, investment, public 
procurement and competition.” Report by the European Communities, Trade Policy Review, 11, 
WT/TPR/G/177 (Jan. 22, 2007). In this Strategy, the EU declared the need for comprehensive trade 
agreements that would uphold the need to protect the competitiveness of the EU’s markets while 
safeguarding EU export interests through tariffs and non-tariff barriers. See Global Europe Strategy, 
supra note 66.  
71. See, e.g., The U.S.-Colombia Free Trade Agreement: Securing Economic Growth and 
American Leadership, BUSINESS ROUNDTABLE (Sept. 7, 2011), 
http://businessroundtable.org/studies-and-reports/the-u.s.-colombia-free-trade-agreement-securing-
economic-growth-and-america.  
72. See JANE KELSEY, S. CTR., RESEARCH PAPER NO. 31, LEGAL ANALYSIS OF SERVICES AND 
INVESTMENT IN THE CARIFORUM-EC EPA: LESSONS FOR OTHER DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 
(July 2010), 
http://www.southcentre.org/index.php?option=com_docman&task=doc_download&gid=1860&Ite
mid=182&lang=en. 
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or regional agreements.73 The EC is currently negotiating with or has 
interim agreements with several of the ACP countries, but currently only 
has a comprehensive EPA with the CARIFORUM countries, a 
Caribbean regional group of fifteen full member countries.74 This 
CARIFORUM–EC EPA is the first trade agreement that has been 
concluded using the template approved by the Council of Europe and 
therefore is an example of the model that the EU will use in similar 
agreements.75 
Some key elements of the CARIFORUM EPA include: member 
nations agreed to liberalize 86.9% of imports from the EU within 25 
years—82.7% within the first fifteen years— when prior to the 
agreement, only 51% of EU imports were duty free; member nations will 
be given a transition period of up to twenty-five years on some products, 
and can use a general moratorium for the first three years of the 
agreement; CARIFORUM nations can maintain other duties and charges 
for up to seven years of the agreement, before they must phase them out 
during the subsequent three years; “regional preference” will extend any 
concession granted to one country to all member countries; and finally, 
the EU will liberalize 94% of its services sector, CARIFORUM 
countries will liberalize 75%, and least developed countries (LDC) will 
liberalize 65%.76 
The CARIFORUM EPA has been held out as a “Trade Partnership for 
Sustainable Development”—emphasizing its objective to be consistent 
with using scarce resources in a manner that they will be available for 
future generations.77 There are reasons to doubt that the CARIFORUM 
EPA will promote sustainable development, discussed further below. 
                                                     
73. Id. at 32; see also Global Europe Strategy, supra note 70, at 12 (“We will also take into 
account the development needs of our partners and the potential impact of any agreement on other 
developing countries, in particular the potential effects on poor countries’ preferential access to EU 
markets. The possible impact on development should be included as part of the overall impact 
assessment that will be conducted before deciding to launch FTA negotiations. In line with our 
position in the WTO, we will encourage our FTA partners to facilitate access by least-developed 
countries to their market, if possible by granting duty and quota free access.”). 
74. See Overview of EPA – State of Play, EUROPEAN COMM’N (Feb. 5, 2010), 
http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2009/september/tradoc_144912.pdf.  
75. See KELSEY, supra note 72, at i, iv, ix, 1. 
76. Errol Humphrey, Ambassador of Barb. & Vice-Dean of the CARIFORUM College of EPA 
Negotiators, Presentation at the DG Trade-Organized Workshop in Brussels: CARIFORUM EPA 
Negotiations: Initial Reflections on the Outcome (Feb. 13, 2008), 
http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2008/april (follow “tradoc_138606.pdf” hyperlink). 
77. Henning Grosse Ruse-Khan, Tailoring IP Protection for Sustainable Development: An 
Examination of the CARIFORUM EPA, TRADE NEGOTIATIONS INSIGHTS 10 (Eur. Ctr. for Dev. 
Policy Mgmt. and Int’l Ctr. for Trade and Sustainable Dev.) (Nov. 2010), available at 
http://ictsd.org/i/news/tni/94176/.  
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The EU’s Model EPAs contain similar elements to the U.S. Model 
FTA. However, the EU’s model is viewed as less radical than the U.S. 
template. “[F]or example, the [United States] insists on a negative list 
approach to schedules of commitments, listing sectors and measures that 
are excluded, and on the inclusion of investment expropriation 
provisions that can be enforced through investor-initiated arbitration.”78 
This type of a schedule system makes certain that all new services will 
be covered automatically, excluding only those that have been 
specifically excluded. The EU, on the other hand, takes a “positive list 
approach” that details specific sectors for commitments.79 This allows 
the EU to implement new sectors according to the agreement and does 
not automatically include sectors not explicitly enumerated. 
1. Choice of Countries/Regions 
Countries chosen by the United States and EU for regional and 
bilateral agreements are generally those with which they have a trade 
surplus—countries over which they exercise great market power.80 Thus, 
the United States and EU can use this advantage to influence the 
direction of negotiations and commitments entered into in the 
agreements. The best example of such an agreement is the U.S.–
Morocco FTA—which was promoted by the Bush administration as a 
yardstick for future negotiations.81 The U.S.–Morocco FTA is discussed 
further in Part III below. The converse is also true: the U.S. Congress 
seems hesitant to accept trade agreements with nations to whom the 
United States is indebted. An example of this is the U.S.–Korea FTA, 
which had been caught up in a stalemate in Congress for quite some 
time; in late 2010 there was a breakthrough, but the agreement has yet to 
receive congressional approval.82 
                                                     
78. KELSEY, supra note 72, at 2. 
79. Id. at 25. 
80. Notably, market power may not always be determinative. On this, see discussion of the failed 
U.S.–SACU FTA, infra Part III; see also Christina L. Davis, Do WTO Rules Create a Level Playing 
Field? Lessons from the Experience of Peru and Vietnam, in NEGOTIATING TRADE: DEVELOPING 
COUNTRIES IN THE WTO AND NAFTA 219, 219 (John S. Odell ed., 2006). 
81. Press Release, Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, U.S. and Morocco Conclude Free 
Trade Agreement (Mar. 2004), available at http://www.ustr.gov/about-us/press-office/press-
releases/archives/2004/march/us-and-morocco-conclude-free-trade-agreemen (noting that the 
agreement was a vital step in expanding the network of U.S. FTAs in the Middle East and North 
Africa); see also Overview of the Morocco Free Trade Agreement, OFF. U.S. TRADE 
REPRESENTATIVE, http://www.ustr.gov/trade-agreements/free-trade-agreements/morocco-fta (last 
visited Oct. 19, 2011). 
82. See Overview of the Korea–U.S. Free Trade Agreement, OFF. U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, 
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The United States and the EU also have a much easier time 
negotiating trade agreements with countries that are dependent on their 
economies as export markets.83 These large economies can exercise their 
market power to extract concessions from countries with an interest in 
maintaining or gaining access to their large market. By contrast, it is 
harder for these large economies to negotiate trade treaties with 
countries that have a trade surplus in these large economies, because 
neither the United States nor the EU can exercise the same amount of 
market power against such economies. South Korea has a trade surplus 
in both the EU and the United States. The EU has nevertheless signed a 
free trade deal with South Korea, even though it “runs a deficit with 
South Korea in goods trade.”84 The EU was only able to sign the 
agreement after securing a concession to place a safeguard clause 
allowing it to take emergency measures if increased imports from South 
Korea would “cause serious injury, or threat thereof, to the domestic 
industry.”85 Therefore, even though the EU agreed to sign a free trade 
agreement with a country with which it has a deficit, it used its 
negotiating experience to its advantage. 
II. ACCOUNTING FOR THE TURN TO REGIONAL AND 
BILATERAL TRADE AGREEMENTS 
This section examines the reasons that account for the unmistakable 
commitment among major trading powers like the United States and the 
                                                     
http://www.ustr.gov/trade-agreements/free-trade-agreements/korus-fta (last visited July 17, 2011); 
see also Overview of Trade with Korea, OFF. U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, 
http://www.ustr.gov/countries-regions/japan-korea-apec/korea (last visited July 17, 2011) (detailing 
U.S. goods trade deficit with Korea to be $10 billion in 2009); U.S. Senate Breakthrough for Trade 
Agreements with Korea, Colombia, and Panama, MERCOPRESS (Aug. 4, 2011), 
http://en.mercopress.com/2011/08/04/us-senate-breakthrough-for-trade-agreements-with-korea-
colombia-and-panama; Pace & Thomas, supra note 48. 
83. This Article does not intend to undermine the well established phenomenon that large trading 
countries tend to enter into bilateral and regional trade agreements with other large trading 
countries, particularly those that are geographically proximate. See Scott L. Baier et al., Do 
Economic Integration Agreements Really Work? Issues in Understanding Causes and 
Consequences of the Growth of Regionalism, 31 WORLD ECON. 461, 492–93 (2008). 
84. See Press Release, Eur. Comm’n, EU and South Korea Sign Free Trade Deal (Oct. 6, 2010), 
http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/press/index.cfm?id=626. 
85. Free Trade Agreement, EU-S. Kor., art. 3, Oct. 6, 2010, 2011 O.J. (L 127) 6, http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2011:127:0006:1343:EN:PDF. Safeguard acts 
are a mechanism created under GATT, art. XIX, under which a WTO member may take action to 
protect specific industries from any imported product or products that are causing, or threaten to 
cause, serious injury to an industry. See Safeguard Measures, WORLD TRADE ORG., 
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/safeg_e/safeg_e.htm (last visited July 21, 2011). 
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EU to turn to regional trade agreements. These reasons include the 
failure of multilateral trade negotiations where developing and 
developed countries are locked in an impasse in part because of their 
conflicting priorities. It is notable that Brazil, Russia, India, and China 
have not been left out of this trend; some of their bilateral and regional 
trade initiatives are referred to below.86 Before delving into these issues, 
this part of the Article will first examine standard justifications for 
regional and bilateral trade agreements. 
A. Standard Justifications for Regionalism and Bilateralism 
Emphasize the Benefits to Developing Countries 
Traditional arguments used to justify the shift to regionalism and 
bilateralism focus on ease of implementation because of geographical 
location; cultural and political proximity and their compatibility with the 
rules of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade and the WTO. 
These arguments87 do not adequately explain the current accelerated 
trend towards trade regionalism and bilateralism.88 This section briefly 
outlines some of these traditional justifications in favor of trade 
regionalism and bilateralism to provide some background context 
against which to appreciate the immediate reasons for the spike in 
regional and bilateral trade agreements.89 
There are three traditional justifications for bilateral and regional 
trade agreements. First, some argue that bilateral and regional trade 
agreements are easier to create and implement than multilateral 
agreements because great geographical differences between various 
regions can make global cooperation extremely complicated.90 Countries 
                                                     
86. For more on China in Africa, see JAMES THUO GATHII, AFRICAN REGIONAL TRADE 
AGREEMENTS AS LEGAL REGIMES (2011). 
87. This refers to arguments supporting trade regionalism or bilateralism that fail to take into 
account that the overriding objectives of these agreements today are not the standard arguments in 
favor of free trade but much more mercantilist ideas of foreign market opening and job creation, a 
phenomenon that in the United States coincided with Laura Tyson’s tenure as U.S. Trade 
Representative. See LAURA D’ANDREA TYSON, WHO’S BASHING WHOM?: TRADE CONFLICT IN 
HIGH-TECHNOLOGY INDUSTRIES (1992). 
88. This Article shows the continued use of regional and bilateral agreements particularly by big 
economies as tools to pry open foreign markets while keeping their own closed. That trend for the 
United States began in earnest in the 1980s. See AGGRESSIVE UNILATERALISM: AMERICA’S 301 
TRADE POLICY AND THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM (Jagdish Bhagwati & Hugh T. Patrick eds., 
1991).  
89. For reasons accounting for the current rise in bilateral and regional trade agreements, see 
discussion infra Part II.B. 
90. See Robert Devlin & Ricardo French-Davis, Towards an Evaluation of Regional Integration 
in Latin America in the 1990s, in REGIONAL INTEGRATION AND MULTILATERAL COOPERATION IN 
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from each sector have different concerns that are not easily solved 
through multilateral trade agreements. 
Bilateral and regional agreements can account for the different 
conditions of particular regions.91 Because each region has specific 
needs, countries can independently agree to accords that benefit all 
parties.92 For example, because coastal nations have issues of interest 
that do not concern land-locked nations, it would likely be much simpler 
for such nations to resolve their issues in a bilateral or regional 
agreement than in a multilateral setting involving land-locked nations. In 
addition, bilateral and regional trade agreements are likely to be reached 
much faster than multilateral agreements.93 
Second, some contend that the cultural, geographical, and political 
proximity of the participating countries also promotes the spread of 
bilateral and regional agreements.94 According to this claim, because 
neighboring countries have similar interests and strong cultural ties with 
each other,95 they can negotiate agreements that are beneficial to all 
parties much more quickly than in a multilateral forum.96 
Third, some argue that the rules of the multilateral trading system 
permit the existence of regional and bilateral trade agreements.97 Indeed, 
both the GATT and the General Agreement on Trade in Services 
                                                     
THE GLOBAL ECONOMY 96 (Jan Joost Teunissen ed., 1998) (noting that geographically close 
countries tend to have more specialized trade because of cultural similarities and ease of transport, 
while farther countries face transport and cultural challenges). 
91. See generally Paul Bowles & Brian MacLean, Understanding Trade Bloc Formation: The 
Case of the ASEAN Free Trade Area, 3 REV. INT’L POL. ECON. 319 (explaining benefits received by 
Association of Southeast Asian (ASEAN) nations by negotiating as a bloc). 
92. See id. at 328 (discussing the characteristics of trade blocs). 
93. See Nathalie Chalifour, Global Trade Rules and the World’s Forests: Taking Stock of the 
World Trade Organization’s Implications for Forests, 12 GEO. INT’L ENVTL. L. REV. 575, 583 n.52 
(2000) (citing PIERRE MARC JOHNSON & ANDRE BEAULIEU, THE ENVIRONMENT AND NAFTA: 
UNDERSTANDING AND IMPLEMENTING THE NEW CONTINENTAL LAW 1 (1996)). 
94. See Bowles & MacLean, supra note 91, at 328 (discussing “successful blocs”); Sanford 
Gaines, Environmental Protection in Regional Trade Agreements: Realizing the Potential, 28 ST. 
LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 253, 262 (2008) (This addresses the use of RTAs to further regional 
awareness and protection of the environment, especially for “countries close enough to each other 
that environmental behavior in one country may have a direct effect on another.” Thus, nations with 
a close political proximity can use regional trade agreements to further issues of mutual interest.). 
95. See Matthew W. Barrier, Regionalization: The Choice of a New Millennium, 9 CURRENTS 
INT’L TRADE L.J. 25, 26 (2000). 
96. Id. at 33 (“[R]egional trade area integration is the fastest mode of investment cohesion that is 
presently acceptable by many countries around the world.”). 
97. See generally Roland Bartels, Regional Trade Agreements, in MAX PLANCK ENCYCLOPEDIA 
OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW (R. Wolfrum et al., ed) (Oxford Univ. Press 2010). 
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(GATS) allow the creation of RTAs under certain conditions.98 Article 
XXIV of GATT provides that “contracting parties recognize the 
desirability of increasing freedom of trade by the development, through 
voluntary agreements, of closer integration between the economies of 
the countries parties to such agreements.”99 GATS has similar provisions 
concerning services or service suppliers.100 In addition, the decision on 
“Differential and More Favorable Treatment, Reciprocity and Fuller 
Participation of Developing Countries” allows developing countries to 
extend preferences to each other without offering the same preferences 
to other members.101 As discussed in Part II, these standard justifications 
for regional and bilateral trade agreements differ from the more 
immediate reasons, such as constructivist diffusion as discussed in this 
article, that account for the contemporary rise of these agreements. 
B. The Breakdown of Multilateral Negotiations Has Resulted in 
Forum Shifting 
The continued breakdown of WTO negotiations—indicated by the 
collapse of ministerial meetings in Seattle in 1999 and in Cancún, 
Mexico in 2003—has led developed nations to a shift towards regional 
and bilateral agreements to further goals that have been delayed or 
frustrated at the WTO.102 Negotiations stalled when the ministerial 
conference in 1999 was cancelled due to a lack of agreement among the 
countries and large protest activities outside the conference building.103 
In Cancún, the negotiations collapsed again. This time, developing 
                                                     
98. See generally General Agreement on Trade in Services, art. V, ¶ 1, Jan. 1995, available at 
http://www.worldtradelaw.net/uragreements/gats.pdf [hereinafter GATS]; General Agreement on 
Tariffs and Trade, art. XXIV, ¶ 4, Oct. 30, 1947, 1 Basic Docs. of Int’l Econ. Law 44 (Stephen 
Zamora & Ronald A. Brand eds., 1990) [hereinafter GATT]; GATHII, supra note 86 (examining the 
controversy relating to the permissibility of regional trade agreements). 
99. GATT, supra note 98, at art. XXIV. 
100. GATS, supra note 98. 
101. See Differential and More Favourable Treatment, Reciprocity and Fuller Participation of 
Developing Countries, ¶ 1, L/4903 (Nov. 28, 1979), available at 
http://www.wto.org/English/docs_e/legal_e/enabling_e.pdf. 
102. For more on the breakdown of WTO negotiations in this period, see James Thuo Gathii, The 
High Stakes of WTO Reform, 104 MICH. L. REV. 1361 (2006) (reviewing FATOUMATA JAWARA & 
AILEEN KWA, BEHIND THE SCENES AT THE WTO: THE REAL WORLD OF TRADE NEGOTIATIONS/THE 
LESSONS OF CANCUN (2004)). 
103. See Joseph Kahn, Swiss Forum Has Its Focus on Memories From Seattle, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 
29, 2000, at C1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2000/01/29/business/international-business-
swiss-forum-has-its-focus-on-memories-from-seattle.html?scp=2&sq=protest+seattle+wto+ 
collapse&st=nyt. 
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countries were unwilling to negotiate the “Singapore issues.”104 The 
“Singapore issues” refers to four things—competition policy, trade 
facilitation, investment liberalization, and government procurement—
which developed countries have sought to negotiate with a view to 
arriving at new agreements covering these four areas since 1996.105 In 
August 2004, three of the issues—investment, competition, and 
government procurement—were, by agreement, dropped from the Doha 
agenda.106 Negotiations for trade facilitation, however, would 
continue.107 As one commentator noted, this “ended, for the time being, 
the developed countries’ attempt to greatly expand the WTO by 
introducing three new major areas of liberalization.”108 
Agriculture has also become one of the most important and hotly 
debated issues in these negotiations.109 Developing countries have 
argued that agricultural subsidies, particularly in the United States and 
the EU, create an insuperable barrier for them to sell their agricultural 
goods.110 The wide differences between developed nations and 
                                                     
104. IAN F. FERGUSSON, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL32060, WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION 
NEGOTIATIONS: THE DOHA DEVELOPMENT AGENDA 4 (Jan. 18, 2008), 
http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/69477.pdf; see also Op-Ed., Showdown in Cancún, 
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 10, 2003, at A24, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2003/09/10/opinion/showdown-in-cancun.html. 
105. IAN F. FERGUSSON, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RS21664, THE WTO CANCÚN MINISTERIAL 
(Nov. 6, 2003), 
http://congressionalresearch.com/RS21664/document.php?study=The+WTO+Cancun+Ministerial.  
106. Overview of the Doha Agenda, Cancún 2003, Hong Kong 2005, WORLD TRADE ORG., 
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/doha1_e.htm (last visited Sept. 19, 2011). 
107. See generally MARTIN KHOR, S. CTR., ANALYSIS OF THE DOHA NEGOTIATIONS AND THE 
FUNCTIONING OF THE WTO (Nov. 25 2009) (draft version), 
http://www.southcentre.org/index.php?option=com_docman&task=doc_download&gid=1678&Ite
mid=182&lang=en. 
108. Id. at 8. 
109. See Elizabeth Becker & Ginger Thompson, Poorer Nations Plead Farmers’ Case at Trade 
Talks, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 11, 2003, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2003/09/11/world/poorer-
nations-plead-farmers-case-at-trade-talks.html; see also Committee on Trade and Development, 
Note by the Secretariat, Developmental Aspects of the Doha Round of Negotiations, 2, 
WT/COMTD/W/143/Rev.4 (Aug. 19, 2010) (“Agriculture plays an important role in the 
development of many WTO Members. For a large number of developing countries and least-
developed countries (LDCs), agriculture makes a significant contribution to their economies, 
including its direct contribution to gross domestic production, export revenue and employment as 
well as to rural development and livelihood security . . . . However, many of the world’s agricultural 
producers are currently disadvantaged in the world trading environment because of high tariff 
barriers and competition from producers that receive high levels of domestic or export-related 
support.”). 
110. See KHOR, supra note 107, at 22; see also Kevin C. Kennedy, The Incoherence of 
Agricultural, Trade, and Development Policy for Sub-Saharan Africa: Sowing the Seeds of False 
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developing nations on these and related issues continue to make it 
unlikely that current WTO negotiations will be successfully concluded 
any time soon.111 
In a sense, the current stalemate in the Doha round of negotiations 
primarily pits developed countries against developing countries. 
Developed countries subscribe to a vision of development that many 
developing countries contest. Developing countries argue that developed 
nations have been inattentive to development issues that matter to them. 
This is because developed countries insist that developing countries 
should adopt policies that prioritize economic growth through increased 
export trade at the expense of other development objectives such as the 
protection of the weak and vulnerable.112 In fact, developing countries 
argue that their development prospects would be much better addressed 
by removing agricultural subsidies in developed country markets; 
ensuring access to affordable essential medicines for epidemics such as 
HIV/AIDS; continuing special and differential treatment of developing 
countries for their products, produce and services; and putting in place a 
special safeguard mechanism (SSM) for their agricultural products—an 
issue that led to a breakdown of Doha round negotiations in Geneva in 
July 2008.113 
As a result of these differences between the priorities of developed 
and developing countries, developed nations have, in large measure, 
shifted forums towards bilateral and regional agreements. Forum shifting 
is a strategy that “attempt[s] to alter the status quo ante by moving treaty 
negotiations, lawmaking initiatives, or standard setting activities from 
one international venue to another.”114 Forum shifting allows countries 
                                                     
Hope for Sub-Saharan Africa’s Cotton Farmers?, 14 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 307, 316 (2005). 
Although U.S. production costs for cotton “are higher, with the help of domestic and export 
subsidies, U.S. cotton growers—the world’s largest exporters of cotton—suppress and depress the 
price of cotton on world markets by increasing its supply through overproduction.” Id. This creates 
a market that is unprofitable for least-developed countries, for which cotton and agriculture play 
greater roles than they do for industrialized countries. Id. at 31. 
111. See KHOR, supra note 107; see also Martin Khor, Long Stalemate Ahead for WTO Talks, S. 
CTR., 
http://www.southcentre.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=1274%3Asb46a1&c
atid=144%3Asouth-bulletin-individual-articles&Itemid=287&lang=en (last visited July 14, 2011). 
112. See James Thuo Gathii, Process and Substance of WTO Reform, 56 RUTGERS L. REV. 885, 
902 (2003) (explaining the United States’ and the EU’s underestimation of how well-organized 
developing countries were at the Cancún Ministerial). 
113. See FERGUSSON, supra note 104, at 9–17; see also Committee on Trade and Development, 
Note by Secretariat: Developmental Aspects of the Doha Round of Negotiations, 5, 
WT/COMTD/W/143 (Aug. 19, 2010) (explaining that even in the March 2010 stocktaking report, 
“[m]embers have not been in a position to substantively resolve matters”). 
114. Anke Dahrendorf, Global Proliferation of Bilateral and Regional Trade Agreements: A 
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to choose a new forum where they will encounter less concerted 
resistance to their agenda, which in turn gives them more wiggle room 
or policy space to achieve their objectives more readily.115 
Forum shifting through the use of regional and bilateral trade 
agreements has yielded successful outcomes for developed countries. 
For example, even though the Singapore issues were dropped from the 
Doha agenda, developed countries are now pursuing them through 
bilateral and regional trade agreements.116 As noted above, Global 
Europe Strategy makes it a priority for the EU to pursue issues of 
investment, competition, and government procurement in its EPAs with 
African, Caribbean, and Pacific countries. Negotiating objectives that 
were unsuccessful in the WTO become part of the EU’s strategy in 
bilateral and regional trade agreements. Further, according to the EU, 
EPAs are also tools for “tackling issues which are not ready for 
multilateral discussion.”117 Thus, objectives such as enhanced 
intellectual property protection and financial liberalization, which are 
not formally part of the Doha agenda, are being negotiated through 
bilateral or regional agreements such as the EPAs.118 Increasingly, 
developed countries are using regional and bilateral agreements to 
achieve objectives that are difficult, if not impossible, to achieve at the 
multilateral level.119 
As noted in a little more detail below, the competition for new 
bilateral and regional trade agreements has prompted countries without 
bilateral or regional agreements to begin seeing themselves as “losers”120 
because their products, produce and services often do not receive the 
preferential treatment or trade concessions that other countries have 
                                                     
Threat for the World Trade Organization and/or for Developing Countries 15 (Maastricht Faculty 
of Law, Working Paper No. 6, 2009) (quoting Laurence R. Helfer, Regime Shifting: The TRIPs 
Agreement and New Dynamics of International Intellectual Property Lawmaking, 29 YALE J. INT’L 
L. 1, 14 (2004)), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1382820. 
115. See, e.g., id. at 16. Anke Dahrendorf believes that these agreements do not preclude 
discussion of these issues in a multilateral forum. Instead, these agreements are seen to function as a 
“laboratory” for future multilateral agreements. Id. at 17. 
116. KHOR, supra note 107, at 9. 
117. Global Europe Strategy, supra note 66, at 10. 
118. Id. 
119. Committee on Regional Trade Agreements, Note on the Meeting of 15–16 March 2010, 
WT/REG/M/56 (Mar. 23, 2010) (“The representative of El Salvador remarked that RTAs 
represented an instrument to achieve deeper trade liberalization and, more recently, to strengthen 
relationships between countries beyond trade.”). 
120. Fredrick M. Abbott, A New Dominant Trade Species Emerges: Is Bilateralism A Threat?, 10 
J. INT’L ECON. L. 571, 577 (2007). 
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negotiated.121 Indeed, even the Obama administration seems to believe 
that the domestic economy will suffer if the United States does “not join 
the wave of PTAs.”122 
Laurence Helfer has argued that “regime shifting might actually serve 
the industrialized states’ interests by diverting attention and resources 
from potentially effective treaty-making efforts in [multilateral forums 
such as the] WIPO or the WTO while simultaneously creating the 
appearance of sharing developing countries’ concerns.”123 According to 
this view, multilateral trade negotiations leave all countries better off 
than bilateral and regional trade agreements. One scholar has 
summarized some of the varied perspectives on the merits and demerits 
of bilateral and regional agreements versus multilateral trade agreements 
in the following terms: 
For too many years, multilateralists have argued that bilateral 
trade negotiations are a ‘stumbling block’ to the development of 
a WTO-sponsored trade agreement, political leaders have argued 
that bilateral trade negotiations are a ‘building block’ towards a 
WTO-sponsored trade agreement, and the WTO has essentially 
argued that bilateral trade negotiations are a building block and a 
stumbling block.124 
The deadlock and stalemate in WTO negotiations in areas of 
importance to developing countries contrasts sharply with the little 
success that developed countries are often able to eke out in bilateral and 
regional trade deals.125 Indeed, it is more likely that developing countries 
would prefer to have the EU and the United States reduce agricultural 
subsidies at the WTO than in bilateral and regional trade agreements. In 
fact, reducing agricultural subsidies in developed countries is a crucial 
precondition for success of multilateral negotiations.126 Some scholars 
have argued that developing countries may regard WTO negotiations as 
                                                     
121. See id. at 577–78. 
122. See id. at 578. 
123. Laurence R. Helfer, Regime Shifting: The TRIPS Agreement and New Dynamics of 
Intellectual Property Lawmaking, 29 YALE J. INT’L LAW 1, 57 (2004) (footnote omitted); see also 
Ruth L. Okediji, Back to Bilateralism? Pendulum Swings in International Intellectual Property 
Protection, 1 U. OTTAWA L. & TECH. J. 125 (2003). 
124. Larry Crump, Global Trade Policy Development in a Two-Track System, 9 J. INT’L ECON. L. 
487, 510 (2006). 
125. See KHOR, supra note 107, at 11–13 (discussing developing countries’ interest in discussing 
implementation issues which were subsequently placed on the “back-burner” in favor of issues of 
importance to developed nations). 
126. Abbott, supra note 120, at 581–82. 
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not being worth the effort if such concessions cannot be won.127 For the 
moment, forum shifting is more advantageous for developed countries 
and yields few results for developing countries. Moreover, once 
countries with little trade negotiating capacity shift away from 
multilateral trade negotiations, issues that could have been pushed to 
fruition might be ignored or given less than full attention as more focus 
and resources are devoted to negotiating regional and bilateral trade 
agreements. 
In addition, there is often no clear understanding of the impact that 
issues negotiated in bilateral agreements and regional trade agreements 
will have on a multilateral trade system.128 Countries that have already 
entered into regional trade agreements are only now looking back to 
understand the effects these agreements will have on their economies 
and on the world trading system.129 The Committee on Regional Trade 
Agreements has begun using the Transparency Mechanism130 to closely 
analyze the merits and demerits of RTAs and make recommendations for 
future negotiations.131 
C. Forum Shifting Reduces Developing Countries’ Opportunities to 
Form Regional Coalitions 
As noted above, the United States and EU have found that it is much 
easier to negotiate with countries individually or in small groups than at 
the WTO. This strategy serves the interests of developed nations because 
they can use their market power to leverage negotiations to their 
advantage over much weaker economies. Bilateralism favors those with 
more resources since it limits the ability of weaker states to form cross-
issue alliances which could increase their ability to negotiate with richer 
States.132 Similarly, WTO adjudication in the Dispute Settlement Body 
                                                     
127. Id. 
128. See RICHARD BALDWIN & PHIL THORNTON, MULTILATERALISING REGIONALISM: IDEAS FOR 
A WTO ACTION PLAN ON REGIONALISM (2008). 
129. See Committee on Regional Trade Agreements, Note on the Meeting of 14 June 2010, 
WT/REG/M/57 (June 24, 2010).  
130. The Transparency Mechanism for RTAs was established provisionally on December 14, 
2006, to provide early announcement of any RTAs to the WTO. Transparency Mechanism for 
RTAs, World Trade Organization, http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/region_e/trans_mecha_e.htm 
(last visited Aug. 9, 2011). 
131. Committee on Regional Trade Agreements, Note on the Meeting of 14 June 2010, 
WT/REG/M/57 (June 24, 2010); see also Committee on Regional Trade Agreements, Note on the 
Meeting of 15–16 March 2010, 4, WT/REG/M/56 (Mar. 23, 2010) (outlining committee 
deliberations on how to structure the transparency mechanism). 
132.  Eyal Benvenisti & George W. Downs, The Empire’s New Clothes: Political Economy and 
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increases the likelihood that developing countries will gain better 
outcomes than in bilateral negotiations.133 By contrast, FTAs give 
powerful governments the opportunity to consolidate their vision of 
market governance through debt conditions, enforceable trade 
commitments and tied aid. An example is the Aid for Trade program, a 
$41.7 billion program134 that conditions aid to developing countries on 
subscription to the package of reforms imposed by big donors and 
lenders, including international financial institutions. Aid for Trade may 
further indebt developing economies and undermine rather than 
contribute to poverty eradication.135 FTAs therefore give powerful 
governments an opportunity to “more directly and less publicly 
[pressure] weaker governments to make extensive commitments.”136 
At the Cancún WTO Ministerial Meeting of 2003, a coalition of 
developing countries emerged and helped to “block the adoption of an 
agreement which they viewed as largely ignoring their interests.”137 
Many large developing countries—including Thailand, Brazil, and 
India—worked together to create opposition blocks against developed 
nations.138 Developing countries and their supporters viewed their 
successful effort at blocking the Cancún Ministerial as a victory.139 The 
resort to regional and bilateral trade agreements has taken away the 
                                                     
the Fragmentation of International Law, 60 STAN. L. REV. 595, 595 (2007) 
133. See Christina L. Davis, Do WTO Rules Create a Level Playing Field? Lessons from the 
Experience of Peru and Vietnam, in NEGOTIATING TRADE: DEVELOPING COUNTRIES IN THE WTO 
AND NAFTA 220 (John S. Odell ed., 2006). Davis argues that four mechanisms make this outcome 
likely: (1) a guarantee for the right to negotiate, (2) a common standard for evaluating outcomes, (3) 
option for several countries to join a dispute, and (4) incentives for states to change a policy found 
to violate trade rules. Id. 
134. Committee on Trade and Development, Note by Chairman: On the Meeting of 27 May 2010, 
2, WT/COMTD/AFT/M/15 (July 15, 2010). 
135. But see generally AID FOR TRADE AND DEVELOPMENT (Dominique Njinkeu & Hugo 
Cameron eds., 2008). 
136. Kelsey, supra note 13, at 19. 
137. Gumisai Mutume, Hope Seen in the Ashes of Cancún, AFRICA RECOVERY, Oct. 2003, at 3, 
http://www.un.org/ecosocdev/geninfo/afrec/vol17no3/173wto.htm.  
138. See Showdown in Cancún, supra note 104. 
139. See Gathii, supra note 102, at 1366 (book review explaining authors’ celebration of the 
“Group of 20” or “G20,” a coalition of developing nations that resisted the imposition of developed 
nations’ agendas); see also Press Release, Dep’t of Commerce, G-20 Ministerial Meeting (Mar. 19, 
2005) (India), available at http://commerce.nic.in/wto_sub/g20/pressrel.htm (explaining importance 
of agricultural negotiations in the WTO and the need for developing countries to “garner collective 
strength if they are to succeed in eliminating the practices of a small group of rich nations that 
provide huge amounts of support and protection to their farmers, depress prices, gain undue market 
shares and compromise the food security and livelihoods of billions of farmers across developing 
countries”). 
WLR_October_Gathii_FINAL.docx (Do Not Delete) 11/2/2011  1:59 PM 
448 WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 86:421 
 
potential to build coalitions to advance the interests of developing 
countries, like those formed at Cancún. However, as it will be shown 
below, it is still possible for groups of developing countries to advance 
their interests by declining to enter into trade agreements inimical to 
their interests. 
The EU’s EPA with CARIFORUM countries illustrates the EU’s 
success in effectively extracting concessions from developing countries 
grouped in a region. The EU maintained the negotiating positions it held 
at the WTO when it attended the CARIFORUM negotiations. Unlike at 
the WTO, the CARIFORUM states did not have the bargaining 
advantage that could be accomplished by building coalitions with 
similarly situated countries. Consequently, the EU held fast to its 
position on labor mobility in its EPA with the CARIFORUM nations, as 
it had done in its negotiations with India, by allowing only certain 
classes of immigrants access to the EU. In essence, the EU was able to 
negotiate an asymmetric deal in its favor that restricted access to the EU 
for labor from CARIFORUM states, which they have in plenty.140 The 
commitments that the EU won in the CARIFORUM EPA were 
significantly larger than the service liberalization commitments that the 
CARIFORUM states had committed to “in their GATS 1994 schedules 
and offered in the GATS 2000 negotiations; for example, Suriname went 
from 15 to 75 percent, Grenada from 23 to 69 percent and Guyana from 
19 to 82 percent.”141 This means that the small economies of Suriname 
and Grenada have become that much more open to European firms and 
labor and as such these small economies will face stiff competition from 
far more efficient service providers from the EU. This does not bode 
well for local service providers without the wherewithal to compete with 
these foreign providers. Foreign service providers therefore displace 
local producers, resulting not only in job losses from competing products 
and services but, more importantly, in reducing the ability of local firms 
to innovate, grow or to train their own highly skilled personnel. 
The United States has also leveraged its market power over groups of 
developing countries by holding firm to its model FTA as the minimum 
it is willing to sign onto. The case of SACU, which is discussed at length 
below, is illustrative of this approach. According to Tshediso Matona, 
the South African Director–General of the Department of Trade and 
                                                     
140. See KELSEY, supra note 72, at 81–93. Chapter Four of the EPA seems to suggest entry for 
the elite or well educated classes of CARIFORUM states but holds multiple reservations and 
conditions that prevent many from making use of the access. Kelsey cautions other ACP countries 
against seeking concessions on labor mobility when negotiating with the EU. Id.  
141. Id. at 10. 
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Industry: 
The U.S. approach is not developmental . . . . When we engage 
in trade negotiations at the World Trade Organisation, we make 
the point that countries must open their economies to the extent 
that their economies are able to cope. We want to be able to 
phase in liberalisation, and exempt certain items. They want free 
trade now and they want everything. They want to retain the 
right to subsidise their agriculture. They have a template-based 
approach. One of their agencies conceded: ‘We don’t want to 
negotiate. We put a paper down and show you this is where you 
sign.’142 
With these types of negotiating techniques, it is not surprising that 
less-developed nations have much less room to negotiate terms that are 
beneficial to their economies in a bilateral or regional setting than in a 
multilateral setting such as the WTO. 
D. Other Reasons Accounting for the Spread of Regionalism and 
Bilateralism 
So far, this Article has focused on how the breakdown of multilateral 
trade negotiations and incentives to shift negotiating venues has 
influenced the spread of bilateralism and regionalism. There are, 
however, other explanations: the spread of bilateralism and regionalism 
can also be accounted for by constructivist and competition 
explanations. From this vantage point, none of these theories is in itself 
determinative. Below, these constructivist and competition accounts of 
the spread of bilateralism and regionalism in trade are examined. 
1. The Influence of Global Norms: Constructivist Explanations 
Constructivism provides a sociological explanation for the spread of 
bilateralism and regionalism among countries in the periphery of the 
world trading system. Under this explanation, these countries are simply 
following a fad or the example of developed economies even though no 
solid evidence has established the benefits of bilateralism and 
regionalism.143 Because bilateralism and regionalism are often depicted 
                                                     
142. Michael Hamlyn, U.S. All-or-Nothing Position Derails Free Trade Talks, BILATERALS.ORG 
(Nov. 16, 2006), http://bilaterals.org/spip.php?article6489. 
143. Frank Dobbin, Beth Simmons & Geoffrey Garret, The Global Diffusion of Public Policies: 
Social Construction, Coercion, Competition, or Learning?, 33 ANN. REV. SOC. 449, 451 (2007); see 
also Witold Henisz, Bennet Zelner & Mauro Guillen, The Worldwide Diffusion of Market-Oriented 
Infrastructure Reform, 1977–1999, 70 AM. SOC. REV. 871 (2005) (arguing that emulation explains 
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as integral to economic growth by their proponents, particularly in 
developed countries, economies in the periphery of the world trading 
system have embraced them. 
Constructivism can also account for the rise of bilateral and regional 
trade agreements as a result of the preferences of actors supporting the 
agenda in these agreements within the respective domestic domains 
before these preferences come to constitute those of the state and 
eventually of international society.144 In other words, the neoliberal ideas 
embedded in regional trade agreements do not simply reflect the material 
goals of interest groups, but are also culturally grounded ideals of a 
particular type of economic governance. These neoliberal ideas are 
therefore as much constituted, or given meaning, by the underlying 
material interests,145 as by the ideas and meanings attached to them both 
by actors that shape them and those who are persuaded to adopt them as 
their own.146 Thus, from a constructivist perspective, neoliberalism in 
the core and periphery of the global economic system is produced in part 
by habits and expectations among actors and not simply on the basis of 
imposition. There has indeed been a convergence in academic and policy 
thinking about economic reforms motivated in part by similar 
considerations, such as concern for higher economic growth and greater 
efficiency in the provision of public services.147 
                                                     
the diffusion patterns of market-oriented reforms). 
144. See generally Alexander Wendt, Anarchy is What States Make of It: The Social Construction 
of Power Politics, 46 INT’L ORG. 391 (1992). Wendt argues that “the raw materials out of which 
members of the state system are constituted is created by domestic society before states enter the 
constitutive process of international society.” Id. at 402. Constructivists, according to Wendt, “share 
a cognitive, intersubjective conception of process in which identities and interests are endogenous to 
interaction, rather than a rationalist-behavioral one in which they are exogenous.” Id. at 394. 
145. Realists and critics of neoliberalism would argue that these material interests are the pursuit 
of power. See Janine Brodie, Globalization, Canadian Family Policy, and the Omission of 
Neoliberalism, 88 N.C. L. REV. 1559, 1566 (2010). 
146. See, e.g., Kelly, supra note 1, at 693. Kelly argues that a modified constructivist approach 
can simultaneously acknowledge power and interests as well as how these are constituted, because 
access, process and transparency ameliorate the lack of inclusiveness in defining global norms. She 
also argues that modified constructivism reintroduces national constituency preferences, which 
helps secure compliance with its rules. Id. at 699. Kelly refers to this as the “normative feedback 
loop.” Id. at 674. However, she notes that such a loop is likely to be diluted when a state, after 
forming its identity through the feedback of its domestic constituencies, then has to negotiate with 
other states at the international level. Id. at 721. 
147. See William Mitchell, Beyond Austerity, THE NATION, Mar. 16, 2011, available at 
http://www.thenation.com/article/159288/beyond-austerity (discussing neoliberalism relating to the 
financial crisis); see also Philip G. Cerny, Georg Menz & Susanne Soederberg, Different Roads to 
Globalization: Neoliberalism, the Competition State, and Politics in a More Open World, in 
INTERNALIZING GLOBALIZATION: THE RISE OF NEOLIBERALISM AND THE DECLINE OF NATIONAL 
VARIETIES OF CAPITALISM 1, 19 (Susanne Soederberg, Georg Menz & Philip G. Cerny eds., 2005) 
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While initially neoliberalism in developing countries depended almost 
exclusively on exogenous coercive imposition through conditionality,148 
today the tool kit for its diffusion includes the fact that third world states 
are consciously and increasingly redefining their identities in terms of 
understandings and commitments consistent with neoliberalism.149 Many 
of these countries want to be seen as “safe” for investment and are 
arguably adopting neoliberal ideas as a strategic response to the fact that 
investors want the assurance of investing in economies where they have 
a chance to reap the highest returns. Thus, countries that want to attract 
investment may have to adopt neoliberal reforms independent of any 
direct coercion. 
For this reason, some of the most neoliberal leaning adherents are no 
longer exclusively based at the World Bank, the International Monetary 
Fund (IMF), or in Washington or Brussels. For example, one of the most 
neoliberal outposts in Africa is the small land-locked East African 
country of Rwanda. In 2010, the World Bank’s Doing Business: 
Reforming Through Difficult Times report ranked Rwanda as the world’s 
top performer in the types of regulatory reforms that made it easier for 
doing business.150 Among the reforms Rwanda put in place were: 
reduction in the procedures to start a business to only two so that a new 
business could be started in three days;151 reorganizing the property 
registry to reduce the time it takes to transfer property;152 adopting a 
more efficient import and export system;153 and, increasing investor 
protection and the range of assets that entrepreneurs can use as security 
to secure credit.154 Rwanda has been adopting these types of neoliberal 
                                                     
(discussing the forces moving neoliberalism in the same direction).  
148. Tayyab Mahmud, “Surplus Humanity” and the Margins of Legality: Slums, Slumdogs, and 
Accumulation by Dispossession, 14 CHAP. L. REV. 1, 22 (2010) (citing Vaughan Lowe, The Politics 
of Law-Making: Are the Method and Character of Norm Creation Changing?, in THE ROLE OF LAW 
IN INTERNATIONAL POLITICS: ESSAYS IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 
207, 212 (Michael Byers ed., 2000)). 
149. As noted below, some of this redefinition is stage management with a view to accessing 
credit and capital. See infra notes 165–200 and accompanying text. Additionally, there is clearly 
self-interest in adopting self-binding commitments like neoliberalism as the reigning development 
paradigm. Such commitments are in turn rewarded in a variety of ways including aid and credit. Id. 
150. World Bank and the Int’l Fin. Corp., Doing Business in 2010: Reforming Through Difficult 
Times, at 2 (2009), 
http://www.doingbusiness.org/~/media/fpdkm/doing%20business/documents/annual-
reports/english/db10-fullreport.pdf. 
151. Id. 
152. Id.  
153. Id. at 49. 
154. Id. at 39. 
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reforms since before 2008. The 2011 Doing Business Report noted that 
Rwanda was the second most improved business reformer over the last 
five years and had jumped twelve places to become the fifty-eighth 
ranked country in the 2011 index.155 
Clearly, Rwanda has not recently converted to neoliberalism. Within 
the East African Community, Rwanda has been ahead of all the other 
members in opening its economy to citizens of other member states 
through the rights of residence and establishment, while other member 
states, like Tanzania, have remained reticent.156 In fact, regional and 
international economic integration is a central plank of Rwanda’s Vision 
2020, a policy document aimed at transforming Rwanda into a middle-
income country.157 The other five pillars of this vision are a central part 
of the neoliberal orthodoxy: private-sector-led economy, good 
governance and a capable state, human resource development and a 
knowledge-based economy, infrastructure development, and productive 
and market-oriented agriculture.158 
Rwanda’s economic reforms have been so impressive that Western 
aid donors have ignored the political repression of the opposition in 
Rwanda.159 This is also true of other economic reformers, such as 
Uganda’s Yoweri Museveni and, to some extent, Ethiopia’s Meles 
Zenawi.160 There appear to be other factors at play, including the very 
                                                     
155. World Bank and the Int’l Fin. Corp., Doing Business in 2011: Making a Difference for 
Entrepreneurs, at 4 (2010), 
http://www.doingbusiness.org/~/media/fpdkm/doing%20business/documents/annual-
reports/english/db11-fullreport.pdf. But see Kevin E. Davis & Michael B. Kruse, Taking the 
Measure of Law: The Case of the Doing Business Project, 32 L. & SOC. INQUIRY 1095 (2007) 
(taking a skeptical look at Doing Business reports).  
156. On the East African Community’s Common Market Protocol which came into effect in July 
2010, see GATHII, supra note 86; World Bank and the Int’l Fin. Corp., Doing Business in the East 
African Community 2010, 
http://www.doingbusiness.org/~/media/FPDKM/Doing%20Business/Documents/Profiles/Regional/
DB2010/DB10-East-African-Community.pdf (discussing Rwanda’s advancements over its EAC 
partners). 
157. REPUBLIC OF RWANDA, RWANDA VISION 2020 11 (2010), 
http://www.minecofin.gov.rw/webfm_send/1700.  
158. Id. 
159. See generally Efficiency Versus Freedom: The West Should Not Be Silent When Efficient 
Leaders, Such as Rwanda’s, Squash the Opposition, THE ECONOMIST, Aug. 5, 2010, at 10, 
available at http://www.economist.com/node/16743333.  
160. See Jason McLure, Why Democracy Isn’t Working: Despite an Economic Renaissance, 
Much of Africa is Drifting Toward a New Age of Authoritarianism, NEWSWEEK, Jun. 18, 2010, 
available at http://www.newsweek.com/2010/06/18/why-democracy-isn-t-working.html. 
Museveni’s re-election in February of 2011 resulted in a congratulatory message from the U.S. State 
Department that also noted the limitations Museveni had placed on the opposition to campaign 
freely without intimidation, electoral irregularities such as voter bribery and use of state funds to 
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powerful influences of donor agencies such as USAID and the UK’s 
Department for International Development.161 Undoubtedly, there are 
African government bureaucrats, civil society groups, and organizations 
whose budget lines depend on these market-oriented donors and who 
invariably subscribe to neoliberalism for self-interested reasons. Small 
countries like Rwanda may adopt neoliberalism and seek to reproduce it 
for selfish reasons, such as attracting foreign investment. After all, 
adoption of neoliberalism has been embraced within a community of 
mutual recognition that includes prospective investors and business 
intermediaries, like banks and insurance companies.162 For these actors, 
adoption of neoliberalism also signals to foreign investors that their 
investments would be protected in that country.163 
Another reason for the adoption of neoliberalism is that there is a 
much broader group of economists, including those in the Rwandese 
government, who studied in economics departments that fully subscribe 
to neoliberal economic reformism and believe in the efficacy of its 
ideals. Clearly neoliberalism has come to be adopted by this wide array 
of actors, including government economists and non-governmental 
activists, yet its prevalence cannot be solely accounted for by a narrative 
of imposition through conditionalities.164 Despite the fact that actors 
have the freedom to choose whether or not to adopt neoliberal ideas, 
once created, inter-subjective understandings and expectations acquire a 
self-perpetuating character.165 This is consistent with accounts of 
neoliberalism as practiced through World Bank or IMF conditionalities. 
It is not a one-way street imposition on recipient countries on a take-it-
                                                     
help Museveni retain power as well as the fact there was no independent electoral commission in 
place. See Press Release, Philip J. Crowley, Assistant Secretary, Bureau of Pub. Affairs, State 
Dep’t, Uganda’s Elections (Feb. 27, 2011), http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2011/02/156940.htm. 
On vote bribery, see Rosebell Kagumire, Museveni Gets Another Five Year Lease in Most 
Expensive Election, ROSEBELL’S BLOG (Feb. 24, 2011), 
http://rosebellkagumire.com/2011/02/24/museveni-gets-more-five-year-lease-in-most-expensive-
election-deal/  (noting that Museveni seems to have learned that voter bribery is more efficient than 
election violence). 
161. McLure, supra note 160; see also DAMBISA MOYO, DEAD AID: WHY AID IS NOT WORKING 
AND HOW THERE IS A BETTER WAY FOR AFRICA (2009). 
162. For more on communities of mutual recognition, see generally Wendt, supra note 144. 
163. See Beth Simmons, Money and the Law: Why Comply With the Public International Law of 
Money, 25 YALE J. INT’L L. 323, 342 (2000) (arguing that the IMF uses its sanctioning power 
sparingly because most states comply with IMF policies due to the fact that compliance signals that 
their money is safe and non-compliance would make their countries uncompetitive). 
164. Wendt, supra note 144, at 410 (“Far from being exogenously given, the intersubjective 
knowledge that constitutes competitive identities and interests is constructed every day by processes 
of social will formation.”) (internal quotations omitted).  
165. Id. at 411. 
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or-leave-it basis, but rather, is a bargaining and negotiating process to 
determine the level of borrowed amounts and conditions between 
borrower governments, on the one hand, and the World Bank and IMF, 
on the other.166 Robert Wade has shown how East Asian governments, 
such as Taiwan, bought into the Washington Consensus, but 
implemented a vision of economic governance at variance with their 
professed commitment to neoliberalism.167 This insight about the 
strategic appropriation of neoliberalism dovetails with Alvaro Santos’s 
account of the wide-ranging appeal of the World Bank’s rule of law 
projects,168 because the vague definition of rule of law not only obscures 
contradictions or tensions within it,169 but also appeals to: local 
businesses and associations that have the ability to lobby for a favorable 
business environment;170 public officials and political parties because of 
its promise to reduce corruption;171 judges who seek to use the resources 
provided to increase their professional status;172 legal scholars working 
as consultants;173 lawyers benefitting from more clients;174 and NGO 
activists attracted by the promise to not only combat corruption, but also 
to increase access to justice for the poor, women, and the 
disenfranchised.175 
The diffusion of bilateralism and regionalism from the site of its 
production within the interstices of the Washington Consensus to sites of 
reception, both in developing and developed countries, has been 
documented in the past with regard to other fads.176 For instance, 
                                                     
166. 1 PAUL MOSLEY, JANE HARRIGAN & JOHN TOYE, Preface to AID AND POWER: THE WORLD 
BANK AND POLICY-BASED LENDING, at xiii (2d ed. 1995) (arguing that the best way to understand 
policy-conditioned loans was as a “dynamic bargaining process”). 
167. See Robert Wade, East Asia’s Economic Success: Conflicting Perspectives, Partial Insights, 
Shaky Evidence, 44 WORLD POL. 270 (1992) (discussing neoliberal explanations for East Asian 
economic success as ignoring the importance of government intervention in that success). 
168. Alvaro Santos, The World Bank’s Use of the “Rule of Law” Promise in Economic 
Development, in THE NEW LAW AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT: A CRITICAL APPRAISAL 253, 253 
(David M. Trubek & Alvaro Santos eds., 2006) (“[A] legal order consisting of predictable, 
enforceable and efficient rules required for a market economy to flourish.”). 
169. The rule of law exhibits several contradictions and tensions, for example, between 
individualism and communitarianism or between procedural and substantive justice. See BRIAN Z. 
TAMANAHA, ON THE RULE OF LAW: HISTORY, POLITICS, THEORY 84–85 (2004). 
170. Santos, supra note 168 at 297. 
171. Id. at 281. 
172. Id. at 297. 
173. Id. 
174. Id. at 298–99. 
175. Id. at 298–99. 
176. On diffusion and reception, see generally Duncan Kennedy, Three Globalizations of Law 
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scholars have shown that countries are more likely to ratify women’s 
rights conventions in years when there are rights conferences,177 or how 
the ideas of John Maynard Keynes led to the rise of Keynesian 
economics.178 In this sense, changes in ideas and institutions are 
attributable to socialization. However, constructivism also refers to the 
possibility of producing and reproducing all identities and interests 
anew.179 Notably, my account of the diffusion of neoliberalism is that it 
is not simply being produced in Western capitals like Washington and 
received in the periphery, but rather is being reproduced in the periphery 
as well. After all, neoliberalism has taken many incarnations since it was 
inaugurated in the 1980s and its various manifestations are therefore 
being produced, reproduced, and diffused around the world 
simultaneously. 
The United States and the EU have actively promoted regionalism 
and bilateralism and pursued neoliberal ideas through policy actions. 
Under a constructivist paradigm, these governments have modeled 
behavior that is mimicked by developing economies. This mimicry or 
emulation is voluntary rather than coerced. Neoliberal ideas have, in 
effect, had a constitutive relationship to the growth of bilateralism and 
regionalism in trade. Once bilateralism and regionalism caught on in the 
EU and the United States, the trend seems to have spread among 
developing countries without consideration as to whether or not it was 
beneficial.180 Thus, even some of the smallest, least developed countries 
in the world, such as Lesotho, openly acknowledge that the success of 
regionalism in trade elsewhere has persuaded them to pursue 
regionalism more aggressively.181 
Some have argued that the current rise of bilateral trade agreements is 
                                                     
and Legal Thought: 1850-2000, in THE NEW LAW AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT: A CRITICAL 
APPRAISAL, supra note 168, at 19–73.  
177. Cristine Min Wotipka & Francisco O. Ramirez, World Society and Human Rights: An Event 
History Analysis of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against 
Women, in THE GLOBAL DIFFUSION OF MARKETS AND DEMOCRACY 303, 332 (Beth A. Simmons et 
al. eds., 2008).  
178. See generally PETER A. HALL, THE POLITICAL POWER OF ECONOMIC IDEAS: KEYNESIANISM 
ACROSS NATIONS (Peter A. Hall ed. 1989) (discussing the history of Keynesianism and its 
adoption). 
179. See Wendt, supra note 144, at 411. 
180. Other ideas, such as mass schooling and civil service reforms, have been shown to have 
spread in a similar manner. See Dobbin, Simmons & Garret, supra note 143, at 451–54. 
181. See Propane Lebesa, Minister of Trade and Industry, Opening Address at LDC Trade 
Ministers Meeting (Feb. 2008) (noting that until recently regional economic groupings were not 
pursued as a strategy in that the past but that “in recent years [] it is being experimented with more 
seriously when success of the approach is in evidence elsewhere”). 
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the result the success of the EU model in European integration which has 
in turn often served as a rhetorical model for advocates of regionalism. 
On its part, the EU has been an active proponent of the benefits of 
regionalism.182 The EU is spreading regionalism directly through 
commitments like the Cotonou Agreement with the African, Caribbean, 
and Pacific (ACP) countries.183 The Cotonou Agreement, whose 
objectives include eradication of poverty and integrating ACP countries 
in the global economy, set in motion a series of interim economic 
partnership agreements with various ACP regions and a completed EPA 
with Caribbean countries, the CARIFORUM EPA discussed above.184 
Together, these agreements establish goals and mechanisms to monitor 
what are essentially EU ideas and principles of economic reform and 
trade integration in ACP countries. In this sense, emulation can create 
hegemony because ACP countries adopt the EU’s ideas and principles of 
economic and trade governance as part of their domestic legal and policy 
framework.185 
2. Competition for Resources and Markets 
Just as countries compete for capital and export markets, there is an 
element of competition for the best bilateral or regional trade deal—
particularly between the EU, the United States, Brazil, India, and China 
                                                     
182. Mario Telò, Between Trade Liberalization and Various Paths Towards Deeper Cooperation, 
in EUROPEAN UNION AND NEW REGIONALISM: REGIONAL ACTORS AND GLOBAL GOVERNANCE IN 
A POST HEGEMONIC WORLD 128, 144 (Mario Telò ed. 2007) (noting an explicit emulation of the 
EU in Africa); see also Albert Higgott, Alternative Models of Regional Cooperation: The Limits of 
Institutionalization in East Asia, in EUROPEAN UNION AND NEW REGIONALISM 75, 77 
(“Regionalism is invariably conceptualized with comparative reference to Europe even though it is 
clear that policy learning and the politics of emulation . . . are major features of the current 
deliberations about regionalism in other parts of the world, and especially East Asia.”). 
183. See Cotonou Agreement, supra note 64, at art. 35(2) (providing that “[e]conomic and trade 
cooperation shall build on regional integration initiatives of ACP States” as a principal objective). 
See Partnership Agreement, ACP-EU, June 23, 2000, 2000 O.J. (L 317) 3, art. 37(1), 
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2000:317:0003:0286:EN:PDF 
(“Economic partnership agreements shall be negotiated during the preparatory period which shall 
end by 31 December 2007 at the latest.”); see also, id. at arts. 35(2), 37(5) (providing a basis for 
conducting EPA negotiation with the regions rather than bilaterally, as part of the Cotonou 
Agreement’s goal of strengthening regionalism in order to integrate ACP countries into the 
international trading system). 
184. For objectives and fundamental principles of the Cotonou Agreement, see Cotonou 
Agreement, supra note 64, at. arts. 1, 2. 
185. See Rita Giacalone, Is European Inter-Regionalism A Relevant Approach for the World or 
Just for Europe? (Jean Monnet/Robert Schuman Paper Series, Vol. 7, No. 14, Sept. 2007), 
http://www6.miami.edu/eucenter/Giacalone-EUregInteg-long070918.pdf. For further discussion, 
see GATHII, supra note 86. 
WLR_October_Gathii_FINAL.docx (Do Not Delete) 11/2/2011  1:59 PM 
2011] NEOLIBERAL TURN IN RTAS 457 
 
on one hand, and developing countries, on the other.186 Thus, the 
propensity to sign a bilateral investment agreement is much higher if 
neighboring countries have signed such agreements.187 Much sought 
after markets are vigorously pursued by countries looking for the best 
trade deal. In addition, countries that want to attract foreign direct 
investment or other trade benefits have been shown to compete by 
offering incentives.188 As discussed above, many countries, including 
LDCs, freely acknowledge that they cannot afford to be left behind. 
The increasing popularity of Most Favored Nation (MFN) clauses in 
bilateral and regional trade agreements189 is further evidence of 
competition for the best trade deals. The MFN clause in the GATT, the 
basic multilateral trade agreement, provides for non-discriminatory 
treatment by obliging signatories to extend the same privileges and 
concessions to all the members of a trade agreement. An MFN clause in 
a regional or bilateral trade agreement may be surprising because it is 
often assumed that regional and bilateral trade agreements confer 
exclusive benefits to the signatories—as such, an MFN clause extending 
benefits to non-members in bilateral and regional agreements 
inconsistently with the GATT MFN clause is very unusual. Developed 
economies like the EU have insisted on MFN clauses particularly in 
EPAs to ensure that whatever concessions are granted under a future 
regional trade agreement are also extended to current regional trade 
signatories. The CARIFORUM EPA has such an MFN clause; it applies 
                                                     
186. See United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, Trade and Development Report, 
53, UNCTAD/TDR/2007 (2007), http://www.unctad.org/en/docs/tdr2007_en.pdf. Some of the best 
academic work done here includes, Bergsten, C.F., “Competitive Liberalization and Global Free 
Trade: A Vision for the Early 21st Century,” Working Paper No. 96-15 (Washington DC, Institute 
for International Economics); Richard E. Baldwin, A Domino Theory of Regionalism, in 
EXPANDING MEMBERSHIP IN THE EUROPEAN UNION 25 (Richard E. Baldwin et al. eds, 1995) 
(advancing the competitive liberalization hypothesis to account for the increased spread of regional 
and bilateral trade agreements and advancing a domino theory to account for the increased spread of 
regionalism and bilateralism). 
187. RASUL SHAMS, HAMBURG INST.  INT’L ECON. (HWWA), PAPER NO. 61, “NATURAL 
INTEGRATION”: A NEW APPROACH TO REGIONAL INTEGRATION IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 6 
(1998), http://ageconsearch.umn.edu/bitstream/26210/1/dp980061.pdf.  
188. See Andrew T. Guzman, Why LDCs Sign Treaties That Hurt Them: Explaining the 
Popularity of Bilateral Investment Treaties, 38 VA. J. INT’L L. 639, 657 (1998) (explaining that poor 
countries sign investment treaties to attract foreign investment even though those treaties are often 
inimical to their best interests). 
189. See El Hadji A. Diouf, Why the MFN Clause Should Not Be Included in EPAs, TRADE 
NEGOTIATIONS INSIGHTS (Eur. Ctr. for Dev. Policy Mgmt. and Int’l Ctr. for Trade and Sustainable 
Dev.), Oct. 2010, at 8, http://www.acp-eu-trade.org/library/files/tni_en_9-8.pdf.; Cheikh Tidiane 
Dièye & Victoria Hanson, MFN Provisions in EPAs: A Threat to South-South Trade?, TRADE 
NEGOTIATIONS INSIGHTS (Eur. Ctr. for Dev. Policy Mgmt. and Int’l Ctr. for Trade and Sustainable 
Dev.), Mar. 2008, at 1, http://www.acp-eu-trade.org/library/files/TNI_EN_7-2.pdf. 
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to all subsequent free trade agreements insofar as they cover customs, 
duties, commercial presence, and investment, cross-border supply of 
services, and where they involve developed countries or major trading 
economies.190 As such, should the CARIFORUM states give the United 
States concessions in these areas, an obligation to extend similar 
concessions to the EU would be automatically triggered. 
Alternatively, MFNs have required signatory countries to commence 
new negotiations upon entering into agreements with other developed 
countries. This requirement is well illustrated in the Pacific Agreement 
on Closer Economic Cooperation (PACER) between New Zealand, 
Australia, and the Pacific Island countries of the South Pacific.191 New 
Zealand and Australia have argued that Article 6(3)(a) and (b) of 
PACER requires all fourteen Pacific Island countries to negotiate a new 
trade agreement following the signing of a Pacific Interim EPA which 
covers trade in goods and that only Fiji and Papua New Guinea have 
signed.192 Australia and New Zealand have helped the Pacific Island 
countries set up a fully funded Office of the Chief Trade Advisor to the 
Forum Island Countries Secretariat to help them negotiate a PACER-
PLUS Agreement. The increasing use of such clauses demonstrates 
rising competition for access to foreign markets with the most 
advantageous concessions possible. 
For example, China and India are in a furious competition for Africa’s 
mineral wealth and access to its markets. This is reflected by the fact that 
both countries are engaged in a race for trade and investment 
agreements.193 These “emerging economic giants” and their burgeoning 
economies are creating a greater demand for natural resources and light 
                                                     
190. See Economic Partnership Agreement, CARIFORUM States-European Cmty., art. 70, Oct. 
30, 2008, 2008 O.J. (L 289) 3, 
http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2008/february/tradoc_137971.pdf [hereinafter CARIFORUM 
EPA]. “Major trading economy” is defined as any developing country representing individually 
more than 1% of world merchandise exports or, a group of countries with more than 1.5% of world 
merchandise exports. Id. at art. 19, ¶ 4. For more on the CARIFORUM EPA, see KELSEY, supra 
note 72.  
191. Pacific Agreement on Closer Economic Relations, PACIFIC ISLANDS FORUM SECRETARIAT, 
http://forum.forumsec.org/resources/uploads/attachments/documents/PACER.pdf (last visited Sept. 
21, 2011). 
192. See Technical Centre for Agricultural and Rural Cooperation [CTA], Executive Brief: 
Update, EPA Negotiation Issues Between Pacific and the EU, 2 (Apr. 2010), 
http://agritrade.cta.int/en/content/download/2721/139440/file/2d63ba16772c8c8f89eb6303aa908bab
.pdf. 
193. Harry G. Broadman, Africa’s Silk Road: China and India’s New Economic Frontier, WORLD 
BANK 1, 42 (2007), 
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/AFRICAEXT/Resources/Africa_Silk_Road.pdf. 
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manufactured goods.194 Although Chinese and Indian foreign direct 
investment (FDI) in Africa have traditionally been concentrated in the 
oil extraction and mining industries, in recent years, FDI flows between 
the two Asian countries and Africa has become more diversified, with 
FDI now in the apparel industry and processed foods, as well as other 
sectors.195 
In order to encourage collective consultation and to promote political 
dialogue and economic cooperation with African countries, China 
established the Forum for China Africa Cooperation (FOCAC).196 
FOCAC’s fourth ministerial conference was hosted by Egypt in 
November 2010197 to review implementation of action items from the 
Beijing Summit of the Forum held three years earlier and to discuss new 
ways to enhance Sino–African trade relations.198 To this end, FOCAC 
adopted the Sharm El Sheikh Action Plan of the Forum on China-Africa 
Cooperation at the conference.199 The Sharm El Sheikh Action Plan 
seeks to strengthen Sino-African cooperation in political affairs; regional 
peace and security; international affairs; economic and social 
development; and cultural and people-to-people exchanges.200 China has 
promised to extend $10 billion in preferential loans to African countries 
over the next three years to be used for infrastructure and social 
development projects.201 China has also agreed to support African 
regional integration efforts.202 At the time of writing, China has signed 
bilateral agreements with thirty-three African countries to expand trade 
and investment and another eleven agreements to avoid double taxation, 
and has investment interests in forty-nine African countries.203 
In sum, this Article has made two primary claims regarding 
competition for resources and markets. First, regional and bilateral trade 
                                                     
194. Id. 
195. Id. 
196. See Characteristics of FOCAC, FORUM ON CHINA-AFRICA COOPERATION, 
http://www.focac.org/eng/ltda/ltjj/t157576.htm (last visited Aug. 21, 2010). 
197. Declaration of Sharm El Sheikh of the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation, FORUM ON 
CHINA-AFRICA COOPERATION (Nov. 12, 2009), http://www.focac.org/eng/zxxx/t626388.htm. 
198. See id. 
199. See id. 
200. See Sharm El Sheikh Action Plan (2010–2012), FORUM ON CHINA-AFRICA COOPERATION 
(Nov. 12, 2009), http://www.focac.org/eng/zxxx/t626387.htm. 
201. Id. at art. 4.3.3. 
202. Id. at art. 4.3.2. 
203. See China-Africa Economic Trade Cooperation, INFO. OFF. ST. COUNCIL (Dec. 28, 2010), 
http://www.gov.cn/english/official/2010-12/23/content_1771603.htm. 
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agreements are now a preferred policy preference for both developing 
and developed countries. The breakdown of WTO negotiations has 
played an important role in the proliferation of regional and bilateral 
trade agreements; countries have shifted from the WTO’s trade 
framework to regional and bilateral trade agreements. Second, a 
convergence in policy preferences in favor of free trade as a national 
economic strategy is an equally important factor accounting for the 
popularity of regional and bilateral trade agreements. This common 
policy preference undermines claims that developed countries have 
imposed their free trade preferences on developing countries. However, 
many of the bilateral trade agreements negotiated between developing 
and developed countries impose unequal obligations on developing 
countries. Part III of this Article will further examine these inequities by 
showing that bilateral agreements have become an important avenue for 
promoting the neoliberal agenda of the Washington Consensus—free 
trade, openness to foreign investment, and free market reforms such as 
deregulation and privatization. 
III.  FORTIFYING THE NEOLIBERAL AGENDA OF THE 
WASHINGTON CONSENSUS 
Bilateral and regional trade agreements have become a major avenue 
for implementing the Washington Consensus in developing countries. 
The Washington Consensus has ten elements: fiscal discipline, 
redirection of public expenditures to fields offering high economic 
returns, tax reform, interest rate liberalization, a competitive exchange 
rate, trade liberalization, liberalization towards foreign direct investment, 
privatization, deregulation, and secured property rights.204 These 
elements, originally outlined in 1989 by John Williamson, have been 
prescribed as necessary to promote economic development in developing 
countries.205 
Openness to trade, foreign direct investment, and market economy 
reforms such as deregulation and privatization of public enterprises, 
have been hallmarks of the Washington Consensus. Advocates of 
openness argue that developing countries can achieve economic 
                                                     
204. Joel M. Ngugi, Policing Neoliberal Reforms: The Rule of Law as an Enabling and 
Restrictive Discourse, 26 U. PA. J. INT’L ECON. L. 513, 584 (2005) (citing John Williamson, What 
Washington Means by Policy Reform, in LATIN AMERICAN ADJUSTMENT: HOW MUCH HAS 
HAPPENED? 5, 7 (John Williamson ed., 1990)). 
205. See John Williamson, Senior Fellow, Inst. for Int’l Econ., The Washington Consensus as 
Policy Prescription for Development, Lecture for the “Practitioners in Development” Series at the 
World Bank (Jan 13. 2004), http://www.iie.com/publications/papers/williamson0204.pdf. 
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development by liberalizing their markets and dismantling the welfare 
state206 so that services such as energy, telecommunications, and water 
are no longer state provided. The IMF and the World Bank have 
conditioned developing countries’ access to funds on their acceptance of 
the Washington Consensus.207 
Regional and bilateral trade agreements have increasingly introduced 
elements of the Washington Consensus into developing economies. For 
example, commitments in the area of trade of services in bilateral and 
regional trade agreements have become a primary route of introducing 
private provisioning of public goods like water, education and health 
care.208 Thus, the market is increasingly supplanting public provisioning 
of important services in accordance with the commitment to market 
governance of the Washington Consensus.209 
Bilateral and regional trade agreements that promote the liberalization 
and deregulation of public services further remove the policy space to 
make public policy decisions that would not be contrary to the 
commitments made in these agreements. For example, the loss of such 
regulatory autonomy following urban water privatization has in some 
instances resulted in degradation of service provisioning while limiting 
the ability of governments to take corrective measures.210 These 
agreements create binding rules of establishment, acquisition, expansion, 
management, conduct, operation, and sale or other disposition of foreign 
investments on the territory of the developing countries. More 
importantly, these rules compel competition for activities that were 
previously provided by public monopolies, such as postal services and 
telecommunications. By incorporating such commitments, regional and 
                                                     
206. James Thuo Gathii, Good Governance as a Counter Insurgency Agenda to Oppositional and 
Transformative Social Projects in International Law, 5 BUFF. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 107 (1999); see 
also Chimugwuanya Nwobike, The WTO Compatible ACP-EU Trade Partnership: Interpreting the 
Reciprocity Requirement to Further Development, 8 ASPER REV. INT’L BUS. & TRADE L. 87, 101, 
106 n. 94 (2008). 
207. See Gathii, supra note 206, at 141. 
208. Africa’s Trade in Services and Economic Partnership Agreements, supra note 11, at 1.  
209. See generally KERRY RITTICH, RECHARACTERIZING RESTRUCTURING: LAW, DISTRIBUTION 
AND GENDER IN MARKET REFORM 52 (2002).  
210. For example, Tanzania privatized water provisioning in one of its cities, but was able to 
retake the service after a foreign investor was unable to effectively provide water for city residents. 
The foreign investor brought an arbitration proceeding against Tanzania alleging violations of a 
bilateral investment treaty. Tanzania successfully defended its decision to retake the service and 
cancelled the contract with the foreign investor. See Biwater Gauff, Ltd. v. Tanz., ICSID Case No. 
ARB/05/22, at 99 (July 24, 2008), 
http://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet?requestType=CasesRH&actionVal=showDoc&docI
d=DC1589_En&caseId=C67.  
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bilateral trade agreements have granted American, European, and other 
multinational corporations expanded reach into previously untapped 
consumer markets. 
The EPA between the CARIFORUM states and the EU best illustrates 
how a regional trade agreement can promote the goals of the 
Washington Consensus. The agreement removes the CARIFORUM 
states’ ability to impose currency controls vis-à-vis the EU, thereby 
requiring the liberalization of CARIFORUM financial markets 
consistently with the goals of the Washington consensus.211 Committing 
certain sectors to their services schedule, CARIFORUM states 
automatically open these sectors to foreign investors under the national 
treatment norm.212 Opening CARIFORUM states to migration of high 
level professionals without also obliging the EU to accept low-skilled 
labor from CARIFORUM nations effectively creates unequal obligations 
insofar as the EC gets market opening concessions in the services sector 
without making reciprocating concessions in a services area of 
importance to CARIFORUM states.213 Removing CARIFORUM states’ 
discretion to exercise regulatory authority in any manner that 
discriminates against foreign investor presence and giving them the right 
to have equivalent commercial presence as local investors is consistent 
with the Washington Consensus goal of strengthening investor 
protections.214 
As these commitments come into effect, multinational corporations 
from the EU will have free reign to trade in these nations because local 
governments will no longer have regulatory authority to control the 
corporations’ activities or protect competing local investors. In other 
words, markets that have been traditionally government controlled will 
be open for international investment and control. 
Although the EU successfully negotiated the CARIFORUM 
Agreement to its advantage, it argues that the CARIFORUM nations 
also achieved some of their aims. First, the expiration of the Cotonou 
Agreement215 would have disrupted Caribbean exports and the 
CARIFORUM nations needed to reach some form of agreement with the 
EU to avoid this disruption.216 With no end in sight to WTO 
                                                     
211. See CARIFORUM EPA, supra note 190, at art. 122. 
212. See id. at art. 68. 
213. See id. at arts. 80–83. 
214. See id. at arts. 67–68. 
215. Cotonou Agreement, supra note 64. 
216. See id. at art. 1; see also Overview of the Cotonou Agreement, EUROPEAN COMM’N, 
http://ec.europa.eu/development/geographical/cotonouintro_en.cfm (“The Cotonou Agreement is 
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negotiations, the CARIFORUM nations needed to act quickly to prevent 
the sudden economic turmoil that would result from the expiration of the 
Cotonou Agreement. Second, although the EU service liberalization 
schedules were not significantly greater than their previous negotiated 
amounts, the CARIFORUM nations did receive certain concessions that 
some have argued would have promoted economic growth in 
CARIFORUM countries.217 Third, the modulated tariff liberalization 
schedule allows for a gradual change in tariff schedules that avoids the 
dangers of frontloading. Ambassador Errol Humphrey of the 
CARIFORUM Secretariat argued that this would mean only an 
additional 10.1% of tariff reduction on EU imports over the first ten 
years, and that a significant number of products that receive tariff 
reductions will be those that currently have “nuisance tariffs” and not 
“serious revenue earners or those intended to protect emerging 
industries.”218 Finally, the regional EPA protected the nations in the 
CARIFORUM EPA so that they could maintain their regional unity.219 
The EU could have easily negotiated bilateral agreements with 
individual countries, setting one nation against another and allowing the 
EU to fully use its negotiating strength to its advantage. However, as 
Ambassador Humphrey explained, “[a] central objective of 
CARIFORUM was to retain the integrity of its own regional integration 
process”—a fact it made clear to the EU in negotiations.220 
A. Asymmetrical Liberalization 
So far this Article has discussed how the CARIFORUM EPA in 
particular resulted in commitments that favored the EU at the expense of 
CARIFORUM states. This is not surprising since trade liberalization 
under the aegis of the Washington Consensus is asymmetrical in several 
respects. Developed countries have a comparative advantage in many 
areas that are opened up under regional and bilateral trade agreements—
including services, investment measures, and intellectual property 
rights—while many developing countries have a comparative advantage 
in agriculture, where few or no meaningful concessions are made to 
                                                     
the most comprehensive partnership agreement between developing countries and the EU. Since 
2000, it has been the framework for the EU’s relations with 79 countries from Africa, the Caribbean 
and the Pacific (ACP).”) (last updated Sept. 9, 2011). 
217. KELSEY, supra note 72. 
218. Humphrey, supra note 76, at 5. 
219. Id. at 3 (preferential treatment for regional partners). 
220. Id. at 5. 
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developing countries in these agreements.221 
Overall, developed countries enjoy superior negotiating advantages in 
bilateral and regional trade agreements. For example, with respect to the 
CARIFORUM EPA, the EU successfully negotiated a pro-liberalization 
interpretation of Article V of GATS, which allows the formation of 
regional trade agreements, greatly extending the CARIFORUM states’ 
exposure to international competition. On the other hand, the EU gave 
“very little new liberalization beyond its already extensive GATS 
commitments, especially in areas of interest to the CARIFORUM. The 
result is a gross asymmetry of liberalization in the EPA in favor of the 
EU.”222 
Developed countries are not as concerned about asymmetrical trade 
deals as developing countries. Many developed countries instead argue 
that bilateral and regional agreements are models for future WTO 
negotiations.223 In essence, the assumption here is that these agreements 
are building blocks towards what these countries would like to see at the 
WTO. However, because the terms of these negotiations are often 
controlled by the United States and the EU, developing countries may 
not always find that their experience in bilateral and regional 
negotiations with developed economies set precedent for what they can 
negotiate at the multilateral level.224 As Frederick Abbott has argued, the 
“most troubling aspect of the [Preferential Trade Agreement], 
phenomenon is the exercise of virtually unconstrained political and 
economic power by the United States and [the] EU to secure concessions 
from developing (and developed) countries.”225 
B. Intellectual Property Rights (IPR) and Asymmetrical Liberalization 
Provisions targeting intellectual property rights represent an extreme 
form of asymmetrical liberalization. The United States and the EU have 
used a combination of RTAs, FTAs, and EPAs “to shape the evolution 
of norms in areas such as intellectual property protection and drug 
pricing where they have vital interests at stake and where their position 
on issues is far different from those of the vast majority of states.”226 
The WTO’s TRIPS Agreement, enacted in 1994, set minimum 
                                                     
221. For an expanded view, see Gathii, supra note 112. 
222. KELSEY, supra note 72, at 2. 
223. See Global Europe Strategy, supra note 66; see also KELSEY, supra note 72. 
224. See Abbott, supra note 120, at 582. 
225. Id. at 583. 
226. Benvenisti & Downs, supra note 132 (referring to this phenomenon as serial bilateralism). 
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standards for intellectual property protection in all WTO member 
nations.227 The patent provisions of the TRIPS agreement are now 
widely recognized as correlated to the unavailability of affordable 
essential medicines in developing countries.228 This is because patents 
have been found to be correlated with high prices for essential medicines 
making them unaffordable particularly for low-income people.  WTO 
members addressed this problem by negotiating the Doha Declaration on 
TRIPS and Public Health and a proposed amendment.229 Article 8 of 
TRIPS provides that members may “adopt measures necessary to protect 
public health and nutrition.”230 Some scholars have interpreted the 
TRIPS agreement in light of this objective to protect public health, 
arguing that the agreement should be construed to allow compulsory 
licensing,231 parallel importation, flexibility in defining the scope of 
patentable subject matter, and an early working exception.232 They also 
contend that the agreement should give countries discretion regarding 
the extent of test data protection and the right to control anti-competitive 
practices.233 More definitively, the 2001 Doha Declaration on TRIPS and 
Public Health explicitly recognized that the TRIPS Agreement “does not 
and should not prevent Members from taking measures to protect public 
health.”234 These flexibilities built into the TRIPS Agreement may allow 
                                                     
227. Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, WORLD TRADE ORG. 
(Apr. 15, 1994), http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/trips_e/t_agm0_e.htm [hereinafter TRIPS 
Agreement]. 
228.  Frederick M. Abbott, The Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health: 
Lighting a Dark Corner at the WTO, 5 J. INT’L ECON. L. 469 (2002); James Thuo Gathii, Rights, 
Patents, Markets and the Global AIDS Pandemic, 14 FLA. J. INT’L L. 261 (2002). 
229. James Thuo Gathii, The Legal Status of the Doha Declaration on TRIPS and Public Health 
Under the Vienna Convention of the Law of Treaties, 15 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 291, 302 (2002). 
Patent protections held the potential for limiting access to medicines in a health crisis which TRIPS 
was not intended to cause. Doha alleviated the concern by stating, in part “each provision of the 
TRIPS Agreement shall be read in the light of the object and purpose of the Agreement as 
expressed, in particular, in its objectives and principles.” World Trade Org. [WTO], Declaration on 
the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health, at § 5(a), WT/MIN(01)/DEC/2 (Nov. 14, 2001), 
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/minist_e/min01_e/mindecl_trips_e.htm. 
230. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 227, at art. 8.1. 
231. Timothy Bazzle, Pharmacy of the Developing World: Reconciling Intellectual Property 
Rights in India With the Right to Health: TRIPS, India’s Patent System and Essential Medicines, 42 
GEO. J. INT’L L. 785, 798 (2011) (“TRIPS’s compulsory licensing scheme reflects the balance States 
attempted to strike between IPR protection and the promotion of social welfare.”). 
232. See Charles T. Collins-Chase, The Case Against TRIPS-Plus Protection in Developing 
Countries Facing AIDS Epidemics, 29 U. PA. J. INT’L L. 763, 773–74 (2008) (discussing the 
framework of the TRIPS Agreement). 
233. Id. at 771–75. 
234. Id. at 778 (citing Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health, supra note 229, at 
¶ 4). 
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WTO members to find a balance between strong intellectual property 
protection and the public health and welfare of their citizens. 
However, the United States and the EU have used bilateral and 
regional trade agreements to create even stronger intellectual property 
protection than those created under the TRIPS Agreement. Because the 
TRIPS Agreement only sets minimum standards for intellectual property 
protection, countries are free to negotiate stronger protections through 
bilateral and regional trade agreements, called TRIPS-plus provisions.235 
Developing countries facing public health pandemics such as  
HIV/AIDS, malaria, and tuberculosis preferred not to adopt stronger 
intellectual property rights protections than those required by the TRIPS 
Agreement. This is because strong protections would mean having high-
cost essential medicines under patent. Stronger protections than those in 
the TRIPS Agreement have been referred to as TRIPS-plus provisions. 
The best example of such TRIPS-plus provisions is in the U.S.–
Morocco FTA of January 2003. Referred to as “the most advanced 
[intellectual property] chapter in any FTA negotiated so far” by the U.S. 
pharmaceutical industry, the U.S.–Morocco FTA has substantial 
intellectual property rights provisions with regard to copyrights, 
trademarks, and patents.236 The IPR provisions create strong rules for 
protecting trademarks and copyrights—in particular, they specify 
detailed rules regarding the protection and use of trademarks and 
copyrights, protect the rights of parties involved, and require signatories 
to create means of adjudicating claims.237 The FTA also contains strong 
patent provisions, especially with respect to pharmaceutical products. 
For example, the FTA requires Morocco to prohibit the marketing of 
pharmaceutical products that infringe patents and notify patent owners 
when their patents are infringed.238 
In addition to its FTA with Morocco, the United States has also 
included TRIPS-plus provisions in its bilateral agreements with Jordan 
(2000), Chile (2003), Singapore (2003), Australia (2004), and in the 
                                                     
235. See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 227, at art. 1.1 (“Members may, but shall not be obliged 
to, implement in their law more extensive protection than is required by this Agreement, provided 
that such protection does not contravene the provisions of this Agreement.”). 
236. See FAQ: U.S-Morocco Free Trade Agreement (FTA) answer to How Does the FTA Protect 
Intellectual Property Rights?, EXPORT.GOV (quotations omitted), 
http://www.export.gov/faq/eg_main_017504.asp (last updated Mar. 31, 2011 4:34 PM). 
237. Free Trade Agreement, U.S.-Morocco, art. 15.2–15.7, Jun. 15, 2004, 118 Stat. 1103, 
available at 
http://www.ustr.gov/sites/default/files/uploads/agreements/fta/morocco/asset_upload_file797_3849.
pdf [hereinafter U.S.-Morocco FTA]. 
238. Id. at art. 15.11, ¶ 4. 
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regional trade agreement CAFTA (2004).239  While these countries were 
willing to accept TRIPS-plus provisions, the South African Customs 
Union (SACU) declined to sign off on TRIPS-plus protections, 
regarding them as disproportionately beneficial to the United States. 240 
The SACU’s resistance to concessions imposed by the United States is 
discussed below in my discussion on SACU’s resistance of a U.S. FTA. 
C. Agriculture and Asymmetrical Liberalization 
Asymmetrical liberalization is not limited to intellectual property 
rights. It is also acutely demonstrated in the absence of a commitment to 
liberalize agriculture in the same way liberalization in industrial 
products, intellectual property rights, and services has proceeded. 
Multilateral negotiations in the Doha Round have taken a back seat to 
the liberalization of services and investment opportunities as well as the 
strengthening of intellectual property rights protection in bilateral and 
regional trade agreements. Yet liberalization in agriculture—an area in 
which developing countries have a comparative advantage—has faltered. 
Similarly, development concerns have not fared well in bilateral and 
regional trade agreements or at the WTO, notwithstanding the fact that 
the Doha Ministerial Declaration that launched the current WTO round 
of negotiations in 2001 committed the members to ensuring that 
development was at the heart of the new round of negotiations. The 
lackluster attitude towards agricultural liberalization and development 
contrasts sharply with the strong liberalization commitments made in 
favor of developed countries in the areas of intellectual property rights, 
services, and investment opportunities. Further, even issues of particular 
importance to developing countries, such as removal of cotton subsidies 
and distortions in agriculture, do not receive much attention. For 
example the WTO offers developing countries aid to offset agricultural 
imbalances instead of removing distortion-producing trade measures 
outright.241 
                                                     
239. Collins-Chase, supra note 232, at 779. 
240. See Chelsea Brown, Trade Integration and Institutional Reform in Latin America: Can 
FTAA Be Revived?, 15 LAW & BUS. REV. AM. 221, 228 (2009). 
241. Brazil, for example, settled for technical assistance and capacity-building assistance in the 
cotton sector in Brazil worth $147 million annually as a countermeasure to settle its victory against 
the United States in the WTO Appellate Body decision finding U.S. cotton subsidies to be 
inconsistent with the United States’ WTO obligations. See Press Release, Office of the U.S. Trade 
Representative, U.S., Brazil Agree on Memorandum of Understanding As Part of Path Forward 
Toward Resolution of Cotton Dispute, http://www.ustr.gov/about-us/press-office/press-
releases/2010/april/us-brazil-agree-memorandum-understanding-part-path-f (last visited July 21, 
2011). 
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Another significant problem with bilateral and regional trade 
agreements is that they eliminate conventional means of accommodating 
countries through Special and Differential Treatment as well as the built-
in flexibilities of the multilateral trading system.242 Thus, regional and 
bilateral agreements can potentially exacerbate trade distortions rather 
than resolve them. For example, the subsidized U.S. agricultural market 
has strong adverse effects on Chilean wheat and sugar markets. 
Although the Chilean agricultural sector has gained much from fruit and 
agro-industrial exports to the United States under the Chile–U.S. FTA, 
highly subsidized wheat and sugar from the United States sells at low 
prices, making it difficult for Chilean wheat and sugar farmers to 
compete.243 This could potentially crash Chile’s domestic wheat and 
sugar market, resulting in substantial rural worker displacement.244 As 
the Chile example illustrates, U.S. agricultural subsidies will continue to 
adversely affect developing countries’ access to developed countries’ 
markets unless the United States stops subsidizing its agricultural 
industry.245 
                                                     
242. The Kigali Declaration on the Economic Partnership Agreement Negotiations of the African 
Union’s Conference of Trade Ministers (following a meeting from October 29 to November 2, 
2010) resolved the “commitment to concluding development-friendly EPAs that will contribute 
meaningfully to reducing and ultimately eradicating poverty in our countries. In this regard, we urge 
the EU to dedicate additional, predictable and sustainable resources to specifically address EPA-
related adjustment costs and build productive capacities.” The Kigali Declaration on the Economic 
Partnership Agreement Negotiations of the African Union’s Conference of Trade Ministers, African 
Union, ¶ 3, Nov. 2, 2010, 
http://www.southcentre.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=1432%3Asb52&cati
d=144%3Asouth-bulletin-individual-articles&Itemid=287&lang=en. The Declaration further 
resolved a “commitment to the proposals by the ACP Group that the objective criteria which form 
part of the political objectives agreed by the international community, at the multilateral level, are 
retained to determine the parameters that have to be met to enable the conclusion of the EPAs,” 
implicitly referring to the need for special and differential treatment principles applicable in the 
WTO to apply in EPA negotiations. Id. at ¶ 6.  
243. Lindsay M. Fainé, The Internationalization of Chilean Agriculture: Implications of the 
United States-Chile Free Trade Agreement, 13 MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 383, 400 (2004). 
244. Id. at 401. 
245. And no progress is being made in the multilateral negotiations, either. “The G20 was 
disappointed by the fact that no progress has been achieved in discussion of the trade aspects of 
cotton during the July 2008 Ministerial. The G20 was also concerned that current substantive 
negotiations on cotton seemed to be deadlocked and even back-tracking in the consultations of the 
Special Session on Agriculture. Developing country producers and exporters of cotton, particularly 
the poorest among them, continued to face unfair competition from developed country subsidies. 
The G20 urged developed countries, which accounted for the bulk of trade-distorting subsidies in 
cotton to live up to the mandate.” Sub-Committee on Cotton, Secretariat Progress Report: 
Implementation of the Developed Assistance Aspects of the Cotton-Related Decisions in the 2004 
July Package and Paragraph and Paragraph 12 of the Hong Kong Ministerial, ¶ 6, WT/CFMC/28 
(2010).  
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D. Is Resistance An Option? 
In light of the asymmetrical liberalization in trade as demonstrated 
above, the question arises: is resistance an option for developing 
countries? Can developing countries say no when trade negotiations 
seem to invariably favor developed countries? The next section 
examines these questions. 
1. The SACU Example 
Even though the interests of developed countries are likely to prevail 
in bilateral and regional agreements, there has been some resistance to 
adopting the U.S. Model FTA. The best example of this resistance is the 
case of the Southern African Customs Union. As noted earlier, the 
SACU comprises Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia, South Africa, and 
Swaziland.246 Negotiations for the U.S.–SACU FTA were launched in 
2001, but were suspended in 2004 because of “diverging views on a 
number of issues.”247 The SACU rejected the one-size-fits-all approach 
taken by the United States in its FTAs.248 The United States insisted that 
the SACU accept the standard U.S. Model FTA in its entirety, including 
provisions on intellectual property, government procurement, and 
investment.249 The SACU argued it did not have the resources to enforce 
such extensive provisions.250 For the SACU, the United States’ “golden 
standards of trade relations” were too onerous.251 
                                                     
246. What is SACU?, S. AFR. CUSTOMS UNION, http://www.sacu.int (last visited July 20, 2011).  
247. Trade Negotiations: Bi-lateral Trade, S. AFR. CUSTOMS UNION, 
http://www.sacu.int/traden.php?id=414 (last visited Aug. 14 2011). 
248. See Rodrick Mukumbira, U.S.-SACU Free Trade Talks Hit Snags, BILATERALS.ORG (May 
15, 2006), http://www.bilaterals.org/spip.php?article4712 (“Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia, 
Swaziland, and South Africa refused to join the US free trade parade - citing flaws in the one-size-
fits-all template the US offered.”); see also Statement by Ambassador Schwab at the SACU – 
TIDCA Signing Ceremony, S. AFR. CUSTOMS UNION (July 16, 2008), 
http://www.sacu.int/main.php?include=docs/speeches/2008/sp0716a.html (“We have explored the 
possibility of pursuing an FTA with some African partners, but at this point most countries in the 
region are not yet in a position to undertake the types of commitments that would be required for a 
comprehensive FTA with the United States.” The Ambassador also explains the goal of the United 
States, in the future, to negotiate the “Singapore Issues” with the SACU. “The ultimate goal of the 
TIDCA is to provide an umbrella under which the United States and SACU will be able to negotiate 
a series of trade and investment agreements or understandings on a wide range of issues, including 
sanitary and phytosanitary issues, customs cooperation and trade facilitation, removing technical 
barriers to trade, and investment promotion.”). 
249. See Mukumbira, supra note 248. 
250. See id. 
251. Id. 
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In particular, the SACU objected to the intellectual property rules 
because they would have limited compulsory licensing to governmental 
non-commercial use. The SACU further objected to the five-year 
minimum period of data exclusivity designed to enhance protections for 
clinical trial dates beyond those under the TRIPS Agreement.252 The 
TRIPS-plus terms included in the FTA would have had a significant 
impact on SACU members’ ability to distribute essential medicines 
because they would have been required to limit the use of public health 
flexibilities in TRIPS.253 SACU countries cited the high prevalence of 
the HIV/AIDS epidemic in the region to argue against accepting such 
limitations on their ability to distribute anti-retroviral medicines at 
affordable prices.254 As one scholar has noted, when comparing “the 
costs of AIDS to the anticipated benefits of the FTA . . . the economic 
and social costs outweigh the benefits, and these countries have done 
well to move away from FTAs with the United States.”255 Furthermore, 
South Africa objected to the investment provisions in the U.S. Model 
FTA that required termination of its black empowerment program.256 
The program required investors to employ a certain percentage of black 
employees as a remedy for racial discrimination under apartheid.257 
2. The U.S.–South Korea FTA 
The U.S.–South Korea FTA represents another example of difficult 
negotiations because of resistance to the terms of the agreement. 
Although, as noted earlier, an FTA with South Korea was eventually 
concluded, the United States had long resisted signing the FTA that was 
negotiated in 2007. While the SACU case involved objections to 
provisions imposed by the United States, resistance to the U.S.–South 
Korea FTA came from within the United States. In particular, the U.S. 
                                                     
252. Brook K. Baker, Ending Drug Registration Apartheid: Taming Data Exclusivity and 
Patent/Registration Linkage, 34 AM. J.L. & MED. 303, 341 (2008); see Carlos Maria Correa, 
Implications of Bilateral Free Trade Agreements on Access to Medicines, 84 BULL. WHO 399, 
399–401 (2006). Comprehensive coverage of issues relating to the SACU–U.S. FTA can be found 
in J. CLARK LEITH & JOHN WHALLEY, INST. FOR INT’L ECON., COMPETITIVE LIBERALIZATION AND 
A US-SACU FTA (May 2003), available at 
www.piie.com/publications/chapters_preview/375/12iie3616.pdf. 
253. See Collins-Chase, supra note 232, at 798–801. 
254. Alfonce Mbizwo, AIDS Drugs Dog U.S.-Southern Africa Trade Deal, BILATERALS.ORG 
(Apr. 29, 2005), http://www.bilaterals.org/spip.php?article1795. 
255. Collins-Chase, supra note 232, at 801. 
256. David Schneiderman, Promoting Equality, Black Economic Empowerment, and the Future 
of Investment Rules, 25 S. AFR. J. HUM. RTS. 246, 270–75 (2009).  
257. Id. 
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automobile and beef industries opposed the FTA because they believed 
it would result in domestic job losses.258 Environmental and labor groups 
also opposed—and continue to oppose—the FTA, contending that it 
does little to protect environmental and labor rights.259 Unlike the 
SACU, South Korea has a trade surplus with the United States and a 
significant market share in certain categories of the U.S. market, 
including apparel, textiles, footwear, machinery, electronics, and 
passenger cars.260 In December 2010, South Korea finally made 
agreeable concessions on autos and beef, paving the way to an 
agreement that now remains to be ratified by the U.S. Congress and the 
South Korean Parliament. Congress ratified the FTA in mid-October, 
2011 and the President signed it into law on Friday, October 21, 2011.261 
The U.S.–South Korean FTA therefore illustrates the market power that 
a country with a trade surplus vis-à-vis the United States can have in 
negotiating an FTA. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
This Article has analyzed the upsurge in bilateral and regional trade 
agreements. It has argued that bilateral and regional trade agreements 
today provide a platform for developed countries to leverage aggressive 
unilateralism in trade and to enact WTO Plus obligations in areas such as 
intellectual property rights, trade in services, financial liberalization 
commitments, government procurement, competition, and investment 
measures. As trade negotiations shift to bilateral and regional 
agreements where developed countries can leverage their market power 
to impose economic programs, developing countries are much more 
likely to be hemmed into disadvantageous, enforceable treaty 
commitments. 
However, the SACU’s successful resistance to a standard U.S. Model 
                                                     
258. See William Rogers, Unions Say Korea US Trade Pact Means Job Losses in Both Countries, 
LEFT LAB. REP. (July 8, 2011), http://leftlaborreporter.wordpress.com/2011/07/08/unions-say-korea-
us-trade-pact-means-job-losses-in-both-countries. 
259. See Facing KORUS in the Fight for Fair Trade, SIERRA CLUB, 
http://www.sierraclub.org/trade/downloads/2011-04-korea-factsheet.pdf (last visited Oct. 8, 2011). 
See Press Release, Public Citizen, Obama’s Decision to Push Bush’s NAFTA-Style Korea Trade 
Deal Without Real Fixes Is Major Policy, Political Mistake (Dec. 3, 2010), 
http://www.citizen.org/documents/obama-pushes-bad-korea-deal-statement-dec-3-10.pdf. 
260. See Agenda 2010—U.S.-Korea Free Trade Agreement (KORUS), AM. MANUFACTURING 
TRADE ACTION COALITION, http://www.amtacdc.org/Pages/Policy-Issues.aspx#KORUS (last 
visited Oct. 14, 2011). 
261. See supra, note 46. 
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FTA indicates that such aggressive trade unilateralism does not always 
guarantee one-sided deals. Developing countries can use bilateral trade 
agreements to strengthen development-friendly objectives in the 
intellectual property context as well as to “reconsider the gains and 
losses of the multilateral bargain.”262 Developing countries can also 
move issues horizontally from one institutional domain to another—such 
as from the WTO to the World Intellectual Property Organization, from 
the WTO to the World Health Organization for health issues, or certainly 
from bilateral or regional negotiations to the Conference of Parties of the 
Convention on Biological Diversity.263 
While alternative forums provide a safe place free from unilateral 
pressures to discuss issues often marginalized in other international 
settings,264 not all alternative forums offer opportunities for 
consequential rule making.265 Such forums do however offer these 
countries opportunities to develop and generate counter-norms,266 
political pressure, and the type of coalitions necessary to counter the 
dominance of developed countries in bilateral and regional trade 
negotiations. Yet one cannot underestimate how effectively bilateral and 
regional trade agreements split heterogeneous groups of developing 
countries in ways that undermine their ability to coalesce and bargain 
collectively through the multilateral setting of the WTO.267 
                                                     
262. Okediji, supra note 123, at 145–46.  
263. In October 2010, developing countries at the 2010 Conference of Parties of the Convention 
on Biological Diversity in Nagoya, Japan secured an important victory over industrialized States 
with a legally binding agreement to share equitably the benefits of genetic resources. References to 
market based mechanisms to combat climate change favored by industrialized countries were 
excluded from the meeting outcome documents which reflected the need for strong regulatory 
measures favored by developing countries. See The Nagoya Protocol on Access to Genetic 
Resources and the Fair and Equitable Sharing of Benefits Arising From Their Utilization to the 
Convention on Biological Diversity (Oct. 29, 2010), http:/www.cbd.int/Nagoya/outcomes/; Richard 
Gray, Landmark UN Nagoya Bio-Diversity Deal Agreed to Save Natural World, DAILY 
TELEGRAPH (Oct. 30 2010), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/earth/earthnews/8098540/Landmark-UN-
Nagoya-biodiversity-deal-agreed-to-save-natural-world.html.   
264. See Helfer, supra note 123, at 55; see also Peter Yu, Currents and Crosscurrents in the 
International Intellectual Property Regime, 38 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 323, 408–16 (2004).  
265. Helfer, supra note 123, at 56–57.  
266. Lawrence Helfer makes an analogous point when he argues that such alternative forums 
offer developing countries an opportunity “to generate the political groundwork necessary for new 
rounds of intellectual property lawmaking in the WTO and WIPO.” See id. at 59. 
267. Indeed, as Ruth Okediji has argued, since “regime shifting upsets coalitional dynamics 
between developing countries, the loss on the development side is doubled. Not only is there a 
dilution of a normative proposition, however subtle, but there is also the political loss resulting from 
splinters between developing countries whose membership in various regimes may be different, or 
whose position on issues within the regimes may differ.” Ruth L. Okediji, The International 
Relations of Intellectual Property: Narratives of Developing Country Participation in the Global 
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Further, bilateralism and regionalism in trade are fads that are 
spreading neoliberal economic ideals to the periphery of the global 
trading system. In other words, emulation by small developing countries 
of neoliberal economic ideas and policies is a significant driver of 
economic reform. Developing countries adopt neoliberalism not simply 
because it is imposed, as many previous accounts suggest. Rather, 
neoliberalism is voluntarily adopted for a variety of reasons. First, there 
has been a convergence in the thinking of policymakers and academics 
in developing and developed countries through education or professional 
associations and contacts. Thus, developing countries are not isolated 
jurisdictions shaping their trade policies independently of other 
jurisdictions in developed economies. On this account, developing 
countries—particularly their form of the modern state—were historically 
created by similar projections of metropolitan power or mimicry of post-
colonial elites. Thus, it is difficult to sustain hard and fast boundaries 
between locally produced ideas in a distinct autonomous zone and 
centrally produced ideas generated under the aegis of neoliberalism that 
developing countries must be protected and insulated from. Here, the 
literature on the autonomy of local government from centralized or 
federal decision making is very instructive. As the scholars in this area 
have noted, efforts to promote local autonomy from central power are 
“better understood as efforts to alter the central frameworks within 
which local discretion is inevitably exercised, rather than as attempts to 
substitute centralized command for local control.”268 
Second, government officials in developing countries have adopted 
neoliberal reforms because they believe that such reforms are 
preconditions to achieving increased economic growth and efficiency in 
the public sector. Third, officials in developing countries are 
strategically adopting neoliberal reforms through bilateral and regional 
trade agreements because such reforms signal that a country is “safe” for 
investment. Moreover, these agreements provide budget support that is 
otherwise unavailable to these developing country officials in their home 
country. Fourth, officials in developing countries are often passive 
                                                     
Intellectual Property System, 7 SING. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 315, 373 (2003); see also Benvenisti & 
Downs, supra note 226, at 597, 610 (arguing that powerful regime shifting is favored by powerful 
states since “they know that weaker states are not only more numerous than they are, but they are 
also far more diverse with respect to size, wealth, and their level of development). 
268. See David J. Barron, A Localist Critique of the New Federalism, 51 DUKE L. J. 377, 381 
(2001). This of course is not to suggest that there are no locally specific values and ideas, but rather 
to argue that local ideas exist ‘within a larger, coordinated structure and depend at all times upon 
central law for their autonomy.” Id. at 410–11; see also Gerald E. Frug & David J. Barron, 
International Local Government Law, 38 URB. LAW. 1 (2006). 
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imitators. In the absence of solid evidence as to the efficacy of neoliberal 
ideals and often without having undertaken research into alternative 
reform ideas, these officials rationally resort to neoliberal ideals.269 
In short, this Article has argued that the increased number of regional 
and bilateral trade agreements represents an important opportunity for 
further diffusion of neoliberal economic ideals, an insight often missing 
in leading accounts that have emphasized how this trend conforms to or 
departs from the norms of the WTO. Ultimately, constructivism can 
better account for the circumstances under which neoliberalism arises by 
taking into consideration the context within which these ideas are 
generated and perpetuated, resulting in a policy framework in which 
choices favoring neoliberalism are more likely to be exercised by 
developing countries. 
 
                                                     
269. David Strang & Michael Macy, In Search of Excellence: Fads, Success Stories and Adaptive 
Emulation, 107 AM. J. SOC. (2001) 147, 172. Notably, Katharina Pistor argues that standardization 
of the legal architecture for global markets “will accelerate the process of legal convergence with 
the double benefit of reducing transaction costs for transnational investors and increasing the quality 
of legal institutions in countries whose institutions are less developed.” Katharina Pistor, The 
Standardization of Law and Its Effect on Developing Economies, 50 AM. J. COM. L. 97, 97 (2002). 
Pistor’s point is instructive, particularly if we think of standardization of legal norms as reducing the 
costs of developing country officials to investigate alternatives to neoliberal ideals or their efficacy. 
All they have to do is to adopt them, within margins of discretion of course, as these ideals come to 
be regarded as “best practice” or “efficient.” For this reason, Pistor argues that developing country 
officials come to adopt rules or laws that do not reflect their context and the efficacy of such rules is 
therefore brought into question. Id. at 99. 
